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Abstract 
This thesis first explores how intrusion detection (ID) techniques can be used to provide 
an extra security layer for today‟s typically security-unaware Internet user. A review of 
the ever-growing network security threat is presented along with an analysis of the 
suitability of existing ID systems (IDS) for protecting users of varying security 
expertise. In light of the impracticality of many IDS for today‟s users, a web-enabled, 
agent-based, hybrid IDS is proposed. The motivations for the system are presented 
along with details of its design and implementation. As a test case, the system is 
deployed on the DCU network and results analysed. One of the aims of an IDS is to 
uncover security-related issues in its host network. The issues revealed by our IDS 
demonstrate that a full DCU network security assessment is warranted. This thesis 
describes how such an assessment should be carried out and presents corresponding 
results. A set of security-enhancing recommendations for the DCU network are 
presented. 
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1. Introduction  
Today 1.7 billion people are using the Internet [1].  The Internet is now engrained in 
modern society and culture with 77% of Americans using the Internet and 72% online 
daily [2].  In Ireland, as of 2009, 63% of households have Internet access [3].  In 
addition to its expanding cultural role, the Internet has also become a key business-
enabler.  In Ireland, 92% of Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs) have an Internet 
connection [3] and nearly two thirds of enterprises in the EU have a website [4].  In 
2008, e-commerce sales were worth 106 billion euros to the EU economy [5]. This 
figure is projected to reach 323 billion euros by 2011. The European Future Internet 
ultimately foresees more than 4 billion Internet users [6]. 
Criminals too have noticed this explosion in Internet use as they increasingly target 
Internet users for financial gain through malware and social engineering attacks.  In 
response, a range of security products has been developed by industry to keep Internet 
users safe.  Yet Internet crime continues to thrive and according to Kaspersky Labs 
there was an 800% increase in the number of new malicious programs between 2001 
and 2006 [7].  Computer crime often results in financial loss. 49% of Irish companies 
reported theft of sensitive IT assets and 30% reported denial of service (DoS) attacks in 
2007 [8].  Cybercrime costs vary, however Irish organisations have been the victims of 
single incidents costing over 250K euro to repair and 14% of organisations are spending 
over ten working weeks responding to single issues [8]. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  In section 1.1 we consider the 
factors that contribute to the Internet security problem and make it difficult to solve.  In 
section 1.2 we present the research questions this thesis seeks to answer.  The chapter 
concludes with an outline in section 1.3 of the structure of the remainder of this thesis. 
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Figure 1.1 (from [10]) – Vulnerabilities catalogued yearly by CERT 
 
1.1 The Internet Security Problem 
The three pillars of information security are confidentiality, integrity and availability [9] 
and their maintenance in a computer network is the realm of network security.  Ensuring 
network security requires a layered approach, vigilance and regular updating in order to 
protect against the latest threats.  Threats target vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities have 
been appearing in increasing numbers as illustrated by Figure 1.1 produced from 
numbers made available by the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) [10]. 
The widespread presence of vulnerabilities and the availability to hackers of tools such 
as nmap [11] and frameworks such as Metasploit [12] that automate the hacking 
process, all combine to make attacks relatively simple to mount. Phishing toolkits, 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) kits, virus writing guides, trojans and botnet 
management consoles are all readily available. Figure 1.2 (from [13]) illustrates this 
rising attack sophistication vs. diminishing skill trend.  
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Figure 1.2 (from [13]) - Attack Sophistication Vs. Intruder Knowledge 
 
Figure 1.3 (from [15]) – SQL Slammer Worm Global Coverage after Half an Hour 
After a successful attack, sophisticated malware may be installed to retain a permanent 
presence on an exploited host and it too can be freely downloaded [14].  The popularity 
of the Internet means that malware, when released, spreads rapidly.  The SQL Slammer 
worm, whose global coverage after half an hour is depicted in Figure 1.3 (from [15]), at 
which point 74,855 hosts were infected, was the fastest spreading computer worm in 
history. Although the worm was released in 2003, the underlying vulnerability (a buffer 
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Figure 1.4 (from [16]) – WEP Prevalence 
overflow) had been discovered in 2002. However, a large proportion of Microsoft SQL 
Server administrators failed to apply the released patch. 
Also contributing to the Internet security problem is how users are connecting to it.  
Recent years have seen a surge in the availability of wireless-network-ready devices and 
wireless networks.  Smart phones, PDAs and laptops come WiFi-ready as standard.  
Wireless networks represent a relatively cheap and simple means for businesses to 
attract and meet the needs of Internet-hungry customers with the result that they are 
increasingly common in cafés, hotels, airports etc.  Most users of such networks are 
unaware of the implicit trust they 
place in its administrators and in 
their fellow users.  The 
administrators of such networks are 
often not security conscious.  A 
recent Irish study [16] discovered, 
during a war-driving exercise, that 
as seen in Figure 1.4 (from [16]), of 
3143 access points encountered in 
Dublin city, 60% utilised WEP 
(Wired Equivalent Privacy), 14% applied WPA (WiFi Protected Access) while 25% 
were open and did not encrypt traffic. WEP is notoriously insecure and can be broken in 
a matter of minutes using online utilities such as Aircrack [17]. 
The profile of the typical Internet user is also changing.  A growing number of “security 
unconscious” users are attracted by the World Wide Web (WWW) and a new 
generation of Web 2.0 applications promises to attract even more.  The social 
networking site Facebook has over 300 million active users (50% of whom log in on 
any given day [18]).  Such users install Trojan software, fall for phishing scams and fail 
to heed browser warnings [19].  In 2005 Australian researchers found that only one in 
seven computers in Australia used a firewall and only about one in three used up-to-date 
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antivirus software [20].  In the same report, increasing the security awareness of such 
Internet users was identified as a key objective in fighting the spread of malware.  For 
the purpose of making users aware of the Internet threat and demonstrating to them that 
they are targets, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is ideal. However, given the 
challenges posed to typical users in running relatively simple software such as firewalls 
and antivirus packages, installing, configuring, maintaining and interpreting the output 
of a full IDS such as Snort [21] is infeasible. 
1.2 Research Question 
Intrusion Detection, as part of an overall layered security architecture has the potential 
to greatly decrease the Internet threat for both home users and organisations alike.  IDS 
can make users aware of the threats they face and bring to light insecurities in an 
organisation‟s network.  However, often the security expertise required to install, 
configure and maintain an effective IDS (as well as decipher and react to attacks) is 
unavailable. 
The research question this thesis sets out to answer is whether effective IDS can be 
offered over the Internet as a web service.  Can we develop a system to deliver to a new 
generation of non-security aware users the extra layer of protection an IDS provides?  
The system should be administered over the Web by a skilled third party thus solving 
the complexity issue.  Given the mobility of modern users, monitoring and feedback 
should also be provided where that feedback arrives via a medium with which the vast 
majority of users are familiar, their web browser. 
This thesis describes the motivations for and design and implementation of an IDS 
aimed at answering the above question.  As a test case the system is deployed on the 
DCU network and results are analysed.  One of the goals of an IDS is to identify 
problems in its host network in order that they can be rectified.  The results obtained by 
deploying our IDS on the DCU network, and the security issues they reveal, motivate 
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the second question this thesis seeks to answer: how secure is the DCU network?  The 
thesis proceeds to describe the results of a network security assessment of the DCU 
network.  Some recommendations for improving overall network security are made. 
1.3 Thesis Stucture 
Chapter 2 presents the Internet security threat.  To understand the threat, some context is 
required and the chapter includes a review of network models and protocols.  An attack 
taxonomy is described and applied to a real world security incident.  Evidence, made 
available by honeypots, of the prevalence of attacks on the Internet is presented in order 
to illustrate the hostility of the environment in which the modern Internet user operates. 
Chapter 3 reviews the defences available to fend off Internet attacks.  Firewalls and IDS 
are covered.  This chapter also includes a description of our web-enabled, hybrid IDS 
designed to meet the modern Internet user‟s needs.  Design and implementation issues 
are covered, as are results obtained through deploying the system on the DCU network. 
Issues identified through IDS deployment warrant a full security assessment of the DCU 
network.  The procedures by which such an assessment is typically carried out are 
presented in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of our network security assessment. 
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis.  It reviews the thesis‟s contribution to IDS, makes 
suggestions for future work and presents a set of security-enhancing recommendations 
for the DCU network. 
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2. The Network Security Threat 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, there is a clear need for protecting network connected 
devices against attack.  The aim of this chapter is to present and explain a selection of 
the threats with which network and Internet users are faced today. 
This chapter is structured as follows.  To understand network threats, some context is 
required and in sections 2.1 and 2.2, an overview of Internet standards including the 
TCP/IP model [22] and some of the protocols that implement it are presented.  In 
section 2.3 we discuss an example network attack taxonomy which defines what 
constitutes an attack and provides a standard means for the classification and 
documentation of individual incidents.  We apply the taxonomy to analyse an example 
real world attack.  Finally, in section 2.4, we provide some information regarding the 
current network threat climate to highlight the frequency of attacks. 
2.1  TCP/IP Model 
The TCP/IP model is a four layer descriptive framework for network protocols.  It 
emerged from work carried out by the United States Department of Defence (DoD) 
military technology department, the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) [23] as part of the ARPANET project [24].  The layers of the model need not 
be strictly adhered to when developing network protocols, rather they provide a general 
guideline.  TCP/IP model layers are presented below. 
2.1.1  Application Layer 
This topmost layer or application provides protocols used by applications to 
communicate over a network.  The user interacts with an application which in turn 
passes data to the operating system to be encapsulated by the layer below (transport 
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layer).  The application developer works with application layer protocols and uses 
operating system routines to pass application layer data to the transport layer. 
Examples of application layer protocols include DNS (Domain Name System) [25], 
FTP (File Transfer Protocol) [26], HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) [27], RPC 
(Remote Procedure Call) [28], and SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) 
[29].  DNS is an Internet-based naming service which converts between binary, 
machine-readable IP addresses and textual, human-readable domain names.  DNS 
servers around the world co-operate within a distributed, hierarchical structure to 
support the Internet naming service.  FTP is an efficient and reliable means of 
transferring files between clients across a network.  HTTP is used to request and 
transfer hypertext documents on the World Wide Web over the Internet.  RPC allows a 
client to call routines located on an RPC server across a network connection which then 
execute at that remote location.  SNMP is used to monitor and configure networked 
devices across a TCP/IP connection. 
2.1.2  Transport Layer 
Application data is subsequently encapsulated within a transport layer data unit, and a 
transport layer header added.  Transport layer technologies may be connection-oriented 
(e.g. TCP) or connectionless (e.g. UDP) and add session management to the 
communication.  The transport layer header contains information related to status of the 
connection.  Port numbers provide application addressing and segmentation, flow 
control, congestion control and error control are also handled.  Abstracting this layer 
from the underlying network layer allows session management to be implemented 
without regard to the supporting network technologies.  The TCP and UDP protocols 
are described in more detail in section 2.2. 
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2.1.3  Internet Layer 
The Internet layer deals with routing, or transferring data from one network to another.  
Sending of data across networks entails machine addressing and identification in order 
to pass data between routers along the route from source to destination address.  The 
primary protocol at this level is the Internet Protocol (IP) [30] which is used to transfer 
data across routers, spanning packet-switched networks.  Host-addressing within IP is 
represented by a four byte data type, often written in dotted decimal format, e.g. 
136.206.18.12.  Routing is carried out by a combination of protocols, including Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP) [31], the main routing protocol of the Internet.  Routing 
support protocols such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) [32] (mainly 
used to pass error messages between operating systems) also exist at this layer.  
Transport layer data is encapsulated within the IP header and network hardware needs 
only inspect this header and not within to route the packet. 
2.1.4  Link Layer 
Also known as the Network Interface Layer, in the link layer we find protocols used to 
send data along physical links from device to device.  48 bit Media Access Control 
(MAC) physical addressing is used at this layer by network hardware for sending 
packets between physical nodes.  The link layer thus handles next hop, short-haul 
routing whereas the Internet layer provides long-haul routing across multiple networks.  
Here addresses are re-written along the journey from source to destination based on the 
two physical connections currently passing data between each other.  An important 
protocol at this level is the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [33] which translates IP 
addresses to physical Ethernet MAC addresses so that the destination interface can be 
located and communicated with over Ethernet. 
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Figure 2.1 – TCP/IP Model  
& Equivalent Layers in OSI Model 
2.1.5  Comparisons with the OSI Model 
A number of alternate network models 
exist.  Besides TCP/IP, the most influential 
of these is the OSI model.  The Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference 
Model (ISO 7498 [34]) similarly applies a 
layered approach for guiding development 
of networking protocols.  The OSI model 
consists of seven layers however which 
loosely correspond to the four layers of the 
TCP/IP model as shown in Figure 2.1.   
Today, Internet protocols are inspired 
primarily by the TCP/IP model with the OSI model providing a useful tool for network 
teaching.  We concentrate on the TCP/IP model here since we deal with real world 
security issues. 
2.1.6  Encapsulation 
The layered approach used in the TCP/IP and OSI models means that a protocol handles 
only the intricacies relevant to a specific function.  It encapsulates this data within a 
header and passes it on to be dealt with at another layer.  For example, to follow Figure 
2.2 (adapted from [35]), an application developer writes an application that constructs a 
message using some application protocol (A) and hands it off to the OS.  The OS 
implements and supports transport layer protocols such as UDP or TCP.  The OS places 
a transport layer header (B) on this application header.  Because the OS handles 
transport layer details, applications can use this facility without regard to its internal 
operation.  Next the packet is given an Internet layer header (C) for sending to the 
Internet.  This header will be inspected by routers which do not need to look any deeper 
 11 
 
A. Application Layer Header
B. Transport Layer Header
D. Link Layer Header
C. Internet Layer Header
& Footer
 
Figure 2.2 (adapted from [35]) – TCP/IP Model 
Encapsulation 
into the packet before making 
decisions.  The final addition to 
the packet is a link layer header 
and footer (D) for transferral of 
data on the local physical link.  
This data and its controlling 
protocols are relevant only to 
each interconnection of nodes 
residing on either end of a 
physical link. 
Example 
Consider a user requesting a 
web page through their Internet 
browser.  At the application 
layer, the HTTP request is created by the browser.  Also at the application layer a DNS 
request is made to translate the server name into an IP address.  Next, at the transport 
layer, a TCP header is added by the OS, enclosing the previous HTTP request‟s 
application layer data.  An Internet layer header is added by the OS which specifies 
source and destination addresses allowing network devices to route the packet between 
client and server.  Lastly, the link layer header and footer are added and specify 
information required for passing the packet out on the local network interface.  The 
packet is now ready for passing to the network. 
2.2  Protocols 
We look in detail at a selection of TCP/IP protocols here (we do so to provide context 
for the network threat and to better understand scanning techniques presented in Chapter 
4).  The main transport layer protocols of the Internet are UDP and TCP.  We look 
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firstly at the simpler of the two, UDP before moving on to TCP.  Finally we look at the 
Internet layer protocol, ICMP. 
2.2.1  User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
UDP, RFC 768 [36] is a lightweight, stateless, connectionless, unreliable, unordered 
protocol whose simple transmission service is used to provide a quick and simple 
transfer of packets where error checking and correction are either not necessary or are 
provided at the application level.  The efficiency gained by neglecting connection 
management functions within the protocol is sometimes desirable.  UDP traffic is 
increasing on the Internet recently due to the rising popularity of peer-to-peer (P2P) 
technologies and streaming media [37] applications.  Errors and ordering issues are 
corrected by the application. 
As can be seen in Figure 2.3 (adapted from [36]), the UDP header is accordingly very 
simple, having only parameters for addressing, datagram length and a checksum for 
basic error-checking. 
The Port Abstraction 
A „port‟ abstraction provides for application addressing.  Services bind themselves to 
ports so that applications can locate them, e.g.  DNS may be running on 192.168.1.1 at 
UDP port 53.  Source and destination ports are allocated two bytes of space in the UDP 
header so there are 65,526 possibilities.  Some port numbers are reserved for a particular 
Source Port Destination Port
Length
Bits 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Checksum
Data
 
Figure 2.3 (adapted from [36]) – UDP Header 
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purpose by The Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) [38].  Port numbers are 
subdivided by function as follows: 
2.2.2  Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
TCP (RFC 793) [39] is a connection-oriented protocol which provides session 
management functions such as requesting re-sending of lost packets for reliable 
communications between client and server.  IP alone is unreliable and requires TCP at 
the transport layer to ensure arrival and reassembly of all packet transmissions.  
Communication is optimised for reliability rather than speed.  Like UDP, TCP uses port 
numbering for local addressing, but the operation of TCP is more complex given its 
extra responsibilities.  As depicted in Figure 2.4 (adapted from [39]), the protocol 
header contains significantly more parameters than that of UDP. 
Start End Description 
1 1023 These „well known‟ port numbers are reserved for common services 
and should be used only by them.  Only applications running with 
elevated privileges may listen on these ports in many environments 
including Unix-based OSes for security reasons. 
1024 49,151 The „registered ports‟ are designated for a specific purpose as a 
convenience to Internet programmers.  Applications on these ports 
do not require elevated privileges. 
49,152 65,535 These high numbered ports may be utilised by any application with 
any privilege level and are not each associated with a particular 
purpose.  They are often used temporarily during communications 
with a server, e.g. a web server on port 80 may communicate with a 
client awaiting a response on port 56,789. 
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Server
Client
1. SYN seq=x
2. SYN ACK ack=x+1 seq=y
3. ACK ack=y+1
[DATA]
 
Figure 2.5 (adapted from [39]) – TCP Connection 
Establishment Handshake 
Source Port Destination Port
Window
Sequence Number
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Data
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Figure 2.4 (adapted from [39]) – TCP Header 
Connection Establishment 
Connection establishment is a 
key feature of the TCP protocol.  
A three-way handshake takes 
place as depicted in Figure 2.5 
(adapted from [39]), to initiate 
the connection and synchronise 
the machines before data 
transmission may commence. The client sends a packet with the SYN flag set and a 32 
bit sequence number x to the server to start the process.  The server responds with a 
packet which has the SYN and ACK flags set and acknowledges receipt of the client‟s 
SYN packet by placing x+1 in the acknowledgement number field.  The server also 
defines its own sequence number y in the sequence number field.  The client responds 
with a packet which has the ACK flag set and acknowledges receipt of the server‟s 
sequence number by placing y+1 in the acknowledgement number field.  At this point 
(even within this ACK packet) data transmission may commence.  Sequence numbers 
keep track of ordering of received packets.  After sending of data is complete, 
connection termination takes place. 
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Server
Client
1. FIN seq=x
2. ACK ack=x+1
3. FIN ACK ack=x+1 seq=y
4. ACK ack=y+1
 
Figure 2.6 (adapted from [39]) – TCP 
Connection Termination 
Connection Termination 
Graceful TCP session termination 
is specified by RFC 793 [39].  As 
can be seen in Figure 2.6 (adapted 
from [39]), the teardown process 
begins when a packet is sent by 
the client with the FIN flag set and 
the current sequence number x.  
The server acknowledges this sequence number in a packet with the ACK flag set and 
the acknowledgement number field set to x+1.  This packet is followed by another from 
the server, this time with the FIN and ACK flags set, acknowledgement number again 
set to x+1 and the sequence number field populated with the server‟s current sequence 
number, y.  The client acknowledges the server sequence number by placing y+1 in the 
acknowledgement number field of a packet with the ACK bit set. 
Connection termination may also automatically occur after a timeout to remove dormant 
connections.  Incorrectly programmed applications or unforseen events such as a power 
failure can cause such situations to arise.  RST packets sent by either side of the 
communication alert the other that no more data should be sent and the connection is 
thereby abruptly terminated. 
Packet Sequencing 
Sequence and acknowledgement number fields are used to reorder, track and detect lost 
TCP segments.  The sequence number is incremented for each segment sent to record 
the current byte number.  Each device keeps track of the current sequence number of the 
other and acknowledges receipt of packets by populating the acknowledgement number 
field with the sequence number of the byte which it expects to see next.  A lost segment 
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Figure 2.7 (from [40]) – Sequencing and Flow Control in TCP 
will be detected as the sender receives no corresponding acknowledgement.  See Figure 
2.7 (From [40]) for an example of packet sequencing in action. 
Flow Control 
Flow control aims to optimise the rate of data transmission without flooding the target 
host or network.  The window field of the TCP header is used for this purpose in a 
technique known as “sliding windows”.  A window is the maximum number of bytes 
which a receiver agrees to accept in the current transmission sequence.  Capacity can 
fluctuate over the duration of a communication session and therefore is known as a 
sliding window.  Although the 16 bit size of this data field limits window size to 65,535 
bytes, TCP options can increase this size further.  Starting window size will usually be 
specified by the operating system or application and defaults to 536 bytes.  The sender 
must buffer both outgoing and already sent data until the receiver has acknowledged its 
receipt (in case retransmission is required).  If the client‟s buffer fills, as in Figure 2.7 
(from [40]), the receive window size is set to zero and the window is said to be frozen, 
meaning that the sender must wait until the receiver sends a packet with the window 
size set to a non-zero figure for transmission to recommence. 
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1. ICMP Request
2. ICMP Response
1. ICMP Information
ICMP Request & Response
ICMP Message (not requiring a response)
 
Figure 2.8 (adapted from [32]) – ICMP 
Protocol 
 
2.2.3  Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
ICMP (RFC 792) is one of the 
communication protocols at the 
Internet layer of the TCP/IP model.  
It is used primarily by OSes to 
send error messages notifying 
other systems of unreachable 
destinations, gateways with 
insufficient buffering capacity etc.  
There are also information requests 
defined within the protocol 
however and these may be used for troubleshooting tasks such as to discover if systems 
are alive and responding.  ICMP does not employ the port abstraction associated with 
the TCP and UDP transport layer protocols and therefore messages are addressed 
towards the target machine rather than towards a particular application as illustrated in 
Figure 2.8 (adapted from [32]). 
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Type Description Type Description 
8 Echo Request 0 Echo Reply 
13 Timestamp Request 14 Timestamp Reply 
15 Information Request 16 Information Reply 
17 Address Mask Request 18 Address Mask Reply 
10 Router Solicitation 9 Router Advertisement 
3 Destination Unreachable   
4 Source Quench   
5 Redirect   
11 Time Exceeded   
12 Parameter Problem   
30 Traceroute   
Table 2-1 - ICMP Messages and Their Relationships (if any) 
From Table 2.1, echo, timestamp, information, address mask and router solicitation 
requests may invoke a response from a machine.  All other message types supply 
information without request. 
2.3  Attack Taxonomies 
Having looked at the network context of attacks in the last section we look here at the 
attacks themselves.  Several computer security attack taxonomies have been published 
[41, 42] which attempt to bring structure and categorisation to the topic of attack 
analysis.  We take the example of Howard‟s taxonomy [43], as it is specific to network 
and computer attacks and allows depiction of the entire attack process. 
According to [44] attack classifications are generally based on the attributes of the 
attack, the underlying vulnerability and the attack detection method. 
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This generalisation holds for Howard‟s taxonomy.  According to [45], an attack 
taxonomy should be comprehensible, complete, unambiguous and effective.  The 
classification procedure must be clearly defined and mutually exclusive categories must 
exist.  An attack must be mapped to a single category.  Terminology must comply with 
established security terminology.  A particular taxonomy may not necessarily meet all 
of these requirements but all are desirable properties. 
2.3.1   Howard’s Taxonomy 
Figure 2.9 from Howard‟s Common Language for Computer Security Incidents [43] 
depicts the five logical steps which an attacker must take during an attack.  The attacker 
uses a tool to exploit a vulnerability to perform an action against a target in order to 
achieve an unauthorised result.  An action directed towards a target comprises and 
event.  
 
Tool Vulnerability Action Target
Unauthorised 
Result
Physical Attack Design Probe Account
Increased 
Access
Information 
Exchange
Implementation Scan Process
Disclosure of 
Information
User Command Configuration Flood Data
Corruption of 
Information
Script or 
Program
Authentication Component Denial of Service
Autonomous 
Agent
Bypass Computer
Theft of 
Resources
Toolkit Spoof Network
Distributed Tool Read Internetwork
Data Tap Copy
Steal
Modify
Delete
event
attack
 
Figure 2.9 (from [43]) - Computer and Network Attacks 
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An incident may involve multiple attacks which together reach an overall objective 
(Figure 2.10).  For instance an attacker wishing to steal a credit card database from a 
web server may begin by injecting shellcode into a service which is vulnerable to buffer 
overflow, providing her with a remote shell.  A privilege escalation attack may then be 
required in order to acquire sufficient privileges to access the database.  A data 
modification attack may be required in order to mask evidence.  This group of attacks, 
which together fulfil the objective of retrieving the database constitute an incident. 
 
Below we briefly describe each step in an attack in some more detail. 
Tools 
The first element in Howard‟s model is the tool used to carry out the attack.  More 
generally it is the method by which the attack is carried out.  A physical attack requires 
the attacker being physically located in proximity of the target where she accesses a 
company‟s data storage office and destroys backups for example.  Autonomous agents 
Attackers Objectives
Hackers
Challenge, 
Status, Thrill
Spies Political Gain
Terrorists Financial Gain
Corporate 
Raiders
Damage
Professional 
Criminals
Vandals
Voyeurs
attack (s)
incident
...
 
Figure 2.10 (from [43]) – Howard‟s Computer and Network Incidents 
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function independently of user input such as virus or worms while a virus requires user 
intervention.  A toolkit is a collection of functions which centralises the attack process.  
An example toolkit is the BackTrack [46] live OS which can be run directly from a CD 
and is specifically designed for penetration testing, forensics and recovery so includes 
numerous applications of use to attackers. 
Vulnerability 
A vulnerability is a susceptibility to attack.  In computer terms, this translates to a 
weakness which could allow an attacker to violate confidentiality, availability or 
integrity in the system.  Vulnerabilities may be introduced during the design and 
implementation stages of a software project.  Implementation vulnerabilities may stem 
from insecure data types, logic flaws or a lack of sanitisation within an application.  A 
third type of vulnerability, the configuration vulnerability, is introduced by the user of 
an application who selects inappropriate settings, thus allowing an attacker to exploit 
the system.  Insecure settings may sometimes be the default for an application.  For 
example, an email server may by default be configured to allow relaying of emails, thus 
allowing sending of spam by attackers.  The attacker hopes to exploit a vulnerability 
using one of the aforementioned tools in order to carry out some action. 
Action 
A vulnerability allows the attacker to carry out some action.  This action may include 
any of the following:  
 Probing a system for information related to its setup and/or installed applications 
and services (possibly with a view to launching other attacks) 
 Flooding the target system with data causing it to slow down or cease to 
function 
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 Authenticating through deceptive means by masquerading as a valid user (for 
example, having using a network packet sniffer to catch passwords sent over 
insecure protocols such as telnet) 
 Modifying or deleting information 
Target 
An action is directed towards a target.  The target is a logical or physical entity.  A 
physical entity is a hardware device, for example a computer, network or Internetwork. 
Logical entities consisting of informational items (such as the account of a particular 
user) may also be targets of an attack. 
Unauthorised Result 
The overall goal of an attack is to achieve some unauthorised result.  The goal could be 
privilege escalation for example.  If a low privilege level guest account is available for 
use with FTP, an attacker may attempt to use this as a starting point from which to 
launch further attacks to increase privilege level to ultimately control the machine.  
Disclosure of information involves viewing or stealing of information by persons 
unauthorised to do so.  Denial of service (DoS) involves making a network service or 
system unavailable or inefficient for users.  For critical services which must be online at 
all times, denial of service attacks can be mitigated through load balancing, and over 
provisioning but the DoS problem remains a difficult issue to solve. 
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2.3.2   Case Study: The TJ Maxx Attack 
Here we take the example of a security incident which received a considerable amount 
of media attention, namely the TJ Maxx credit card theft scandal, and apply Howard‟s 
model in its analysis. 
11 people in the US have been charged in connection with the theft of over 40 million 
credit and debit card numbers from TJ Maxx stores in what is considered
1
 to be the 
largest ever identity theft case in the US [47].  TJ Maxx is operated by TJX 
Corporation.  Several analysts estimate JTX will incur costs of between 500 and 1 
billion usd [48] in handling the incident (investigation, customer notification and 
lawyers fees). 
According to InformationWeek [49], three methods were employed in order to steal the 
information over a number of years.  Firstly, computer kiosks within stores were opened 
to insert USB drives containing Trojan applications which allowed the attackers to later 
connect remotely.  These kiosks were connected directly to the company network 
without the protection of a firewall, thereby allowing the attackers full access to this 
network at a later date.  Secondly, many stores used wireless networks protected only 
by the weak WEP encryption scheme, which, as discussed in section 1.2.3, can easily be 
fully broken for key retrieval and full network access.  Finally, in-store credit and debit 
card PIN-pad terminals were replaced with altered replicas which would store details of 
each card processed in a method known as credit card „skimming‟. 
                                                 
1
 As of 5
th
 August 2008. 
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Howard’s Model Applied to TJ Maxx Attack 
The overall incident can be classified as follows. 
Incident 
Attackers Professional Criminals - Attacks were carefully planned and conducted 
by skilled individuals 
Objectives Financial gain - The credit and debit card information was sold on the 
black market and organisers procured large financial rewards [50] 
As mentioned there were three avenues of attack.  Accessing the network through 
kiosks can be broken into two attacks. 
 
Kiosk Trojan Installation 
Tool Physical Attack - The kiosk was physically accessed 
Vulnerability Design - The acceptance of USB devices should have been 
disallowed at kiosks by design 
Action Modify - The kiosks had Trojan software installed to allow 
remote connections 
Target Computer - The kiosks are thereby compromised 
Unauthorised Result Theft of Resources - Kiosk resources can be used 
surreptitiously 
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Kiosk Trojan Network Penetration 
Tool Script or Program - A Trojan 
Vulnerability Design - The internal network should have been firewalled 
from access by kiosks 
Action Steal - The network is now accessible for retrieval of data 
Target Network - The attacker now has access to the target network 
Unauthorised Result Disclosure of Information - Through accessing the network, 
credit card data was attainable 
 
WEP Cracking 
Tool Script or Program - Network sniffer application 
Vulnerability Implementation - Encryption implementation should have been 
configured to use a more secure protocol such as WPA2 
Action Bypass - Security is totally circumvented by cracking the 
encryption 
Target Network - Access to the network is achieved 
Unauthorised Result Disclosure of Information - Once on the internal network, 
sensitive data was attainable 
 
Credit Card Skimming 
Tool Physical Attack - Hacked PIN pad 
Vulnerability Implementation - PIN-pad terminals were not physically 
secured and could be exchanged 
Action Modify - Functionality carried out during the PIN authorisation 
process was altered 
Target Account - Credit and debit card details representing accounts 
Unauthorised Result Disclosure of Information - Credit and debit card details 
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2.3.3  Discussion 
Howard‟s incident-based taxonomy allows for consideration of the entire attack process.  
As mentioned by Hansman [45], one of the desirable elements of a taxonomy is mutual 
exclusion.  This property is not held by Howard‟s taxonomy since classifications can 
often overlap.  For example, within the attacker category for our TJ Maxx 
implementation above, these „Professional Criminals‟ could also be considered to be 
„Corporate Raiders‟. 
2.4  Gauging the Threat with Honeypots 
The TJ Maxx incident is one example of a network attack but how common are such 
attacks?  Honeypots and/or honeynets provide some insights into the threat. 
A honeypot is a computer which is set up with the intention of luring attackers into 
launching attacks against it.  It may be attached to the Internet, usually carrying default 
configurations and without the latest security patches (supplementary controls are 
required however to block successful attackers from reaching other machines on the 
network).  Verbose logging is carried out and all Internet traffic is stored and analysed.  
Any attempted access is considered suspicious since there is no legitimate reason to 
connect.  A group of honeypots on a network are collectively known as a honeynet. 
There are two main reasons for implementing a honeypot or honeynet.  Firstly, research 
honeypots aim only to gather information about the general attack environment and are 
usually used by universities, governments, the military etc., hoping to learn more about 
threats [51].  Production honeypots are deployed to mitigate risk through identification 
of attack patterns within an organisation.  The latter are easier to set up and configure 
than research honeypots, but information gathered is limited to which machine the 
attacks are coming from and which exploits are being attempted.  Research honeypots 
provide more feedback about the attackers and their tools.  Levels of interaction 
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between attacker and honeypot also vary; ranging from low, to medium, to high.  Low 
interaction systems only simulate services (which thus cannot be exploited to gain full 
control of the honeypot).  Medium interaction systems lack a full OS but services are 
more complex than in their low interaction counterparts.  Finally, high interaction 
systems are the most complex, involving intricate design and risk exposure of the real 
operating system and its services.  Research honeypots are typically high interaction 
whereas production honeypots may be low or medium interaction. 
An example functioning honeynet in a third level educational institute in Ireland is 
described in [52].  It allows investigation of recent Internet threats and demonstrates that 
probes to Internet connected systems are extremely common.  The virtual machine 
based, medium interaction honeypots include Ubuntu 8.04, Windows Server 2003 SP2, 
Windows 2000 Professional SP4 and Windows XP SP3.  Results over a three week 
testing period [53] uncover some interesting activity.  Numbers of unsolicited network 
packets exceeded 550,000 and included a worm infection.  Affected ports and services 
are listed in Table 2.2 (from [53]). 
 
 
 
 
Service Port Protocol Attacks 
Reserved (icmp) 0 ICMP 444 
Microsoft-ds 445 TCP 3984 
Netbios 135 TCP 349 
Netbios 139 TCP 3968 
http 80 TCP 722 
telnet 23 TCP 16 
ssh remote login 22 TCP 52 
ms-sql 1435 UDP 118 
Unassigned  1026 UDP 3883 
Unassigned 1027 UDP 3865 
Unassigned 1028 UDP 3714 
Table 2-2 (from [53]) - List of Services on Honeypots and 
Number of Attacks on these Ports 
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These results make it clear that the Internet is fraught with risk of attack and protection 
is vital. 
2.5  Summary and Conclusion 
Having detailed some of the main protocols over which network attacks function, we 
discussed an example attack taxonomy, through which it was possible to demonstrate 
what constitutes an attack including the motivations behind it, procedures carried out 
within and the overall outcome of the attack.  Application of the taxonomy in the 
analysis of a recent, high profile network intrusion incident was presented.  Finally it 
was demonstrated through analysis of honeypot research that network attacks are 
extremely common, leading to the conclusion that implementation of network defences 
is vital, given the importance and increasing ubiquity of the Internet in modern society.  
The following chapter proceeds to discuss defences to these network attacks. 
 29 
 
3. The Defences 
As has been illustrated in Chapters 1 and 2, there is a clearly serious threat of network 
attack from which individuals and organisations must strive to protect themselves.  This 
protection takes several forms including firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS).  
In this chapter we look at how both of these defences operate and how they are 
implemented.  We also describe in detail an IDS designed and implemented as part of 
this research
2
.  Results generated from running this IDS on the campus network are 
presented and analysed. 
This chapter is structured as follows.  In section 3.1 we describe firewalls along with an 
overview of some important concepts in the area.  Section 3.2 introduces intrusion 
detection, detailing relevant concepts and system architectures.  In section 3.3 we 
provide a description of our own IDS including test results and future work.  A 
summary and conclusions are presented in section 3.4. 
3.1  Firewalls 
Firewalls block unwanted network communications and allow only authorised traffic 
according to a set of rules defined by the user [54].  A firewall can be hardware or 
software-based and may exist on the host or at the network perimeter where it assesses 
traffic to the local area network.  Network security configuration will vary across 
organisations but certain considerations always apply in strategically placing firewalls, 
IDS and other security systems.  Following identification of the most vital and valuable 
systems through risk analysis, the latter may require a higher than average degree of 
protection.  See Figure 3.1 for an example network security configuration for a small to 
                                                 
2
 Development of this system was funded under Enterprise Ireland‟s “Proof of Concept” scheme.   
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medium sized company including suitable firewall and IDS locations.  Three main 
generations of firewall exist: first generation - stateless, second generation - application 
layer and third generation - stateful packet filters. 
 
3.1.1 First Generation - Stateless Packet Filters 
Stateless packet filters are simple in design, inspecting each packet individually.  The 
state of a connection is not taken into consideration in making a decision.  An example 
of a popular stateless packet filter is the Linux-based iptables [55] (stateless by default 
but can also be configured for stateful analysis).  Stateless filtering can provide a 
combination of low overhead and high throughput.  However, decision making is not as 
fine-grained as with other firewall types.  
3.1.2 Second Generation - Application Layer Packet Filters 
The application layer packet filter is designed to understand certain application layer 
networking protocols (see Chapter 2) such as HTTP, FTP etc.  This understanding can 
be applied to block certain websites, monitor for downloading of malicious software, 
Internal Servers Internal Local Area Network
Demilitarised Zone
IDS
IDS
Internet
WWWEmail
 
Figure 3.1 - Security Conscious Network Setup Example 
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check whether a disallowed protocol is being used over a non-standard port or whether a 
protocol is being used in a harmful manner.  Examples of application layer packet filters 
include Zorp [56] and WinRoute [57]. 
3.1.3 Third Generation - Stateful Packet Filters 
Stateful firewalls keep track of sessions and a connection is described by parameters 
such as source and destination IP address, ports and the current stage of the 
connection‟s lifetime i.e. session initiation, in progress, closing or closed.  Rules are 
applied to new connections and once accepted, traffic on this connection is allowed.  
Two stateful firewall products are Check Point FireWall-1 [58] and Cisco‟s Adaptive 
Security Appliance (ASA) [59].  See section 3.3 for further information and the author‟s 
implementation of stateful packet inspection in IDS. 
3.2 Intrusion Detection 
Intrusion detection can be deployed in conjunction with a firewall to provide a 
complementary layer of network security.  Intrusion Detection is the disclosure of 
attacks made on IT systems with the intention of breaching the confidentiality, integrity 
or availability of all or part of the system.  An intrusion detection system (IDS) will 
report on attacks whether successful or not in order to provide the network administrator 
with a view of dangerous traffic traversing their network, adding another important 
layer to the security of a network [60]. 
This section is composed as follows.  Section 3.2.1 provides an overview of intrusion 
detection technology.  In section 3.2.2 a description of the main architectures and 
concepts associated with IDS is provided before introducing some example systems in 
section 3.2.3.   
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3.2.1 Intrusion Detection Overview 
The first intrusion detection model was published in 1986 by Dorothy E. Denning [61] 
and IDS has become, over recent years [62], a popular addition to the firewall in a 
network‟s defensive arsenal.  While, as previously mentioned, firewalls are used to 
block intrusions at the network perimeter based on certain traffic characteristic; they 
cannot defend against attacks which target legitimate services.  For example, 
organisations often configure their firewall to allow access to port 80 (HTTP) on the 
Internet web server within their network.  If an intruder attacked this web server and 
gained access to the network, an IDS may detect and flag the resulting internal attack 
traffic (following an intrusion, attackers or malware may attempt to spread to other 
hosts within the internal network).  IDS take a more detailed view of traffic than 
firewalls.  They apply more sophisticated rulesets and use deep packet inspection 
which, in addition to examining TCP, UDP and IP header parameters, can inspect the 
payload of a packet for evidence of attacks and make decisions based on the contents.  
Security reports are generated on any alarm being raised and delivered to administrators 
who must respond accordingly in order for the system to be of security benefit. 
The main incentives for adoption of IDS are as follows: 
 Detection of attacks – The primary function 
 Enforcement of security policies – For ensuring that a network is being utilised 
only in the intended manner 
 Audit trail – Administrator has information on how an attack was carried out and 
the methods used to compromise a system 
 Extra security information – Useful for discovering how adequately other 
security mechanisms are functioning 
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3.2.2 Intrusion Detection Architectures and Concepts 
This section introduces the network, host and hybrid intrusion detection architectures 
along with strengths and weaknesses of each.  Also described are common methods of 
detection: rule-based and anomaly-based analysis. 
Network IDS 
ID systems can be categorised according to where the system itself is physically 
located.  Network IDS (NIDS) monitor traffic on the network, looking for evidence of 
attacks which are then reported to an administrator.  The most popular NIDS is Snort 
[63].  Figure 3.1 in section 3.1 displays possible physical locations for placement of 
NIDS to complement the firewall and monitor the various areas of a network. 
The network IDS has the benefit of monitoring a group of host machines from one 
physical location on the network, meaning minimal associated maintenance as only one 
update is required to cover the entire network with a new rule or configuration option.  
NIDS will usually be invisible to the attacker who either does not realise that this layer 
of protection exists, or is unaware of the specific rules and therefore whether her 
presence on the network has been detected.  Drawbacks include the associated single 
point of failure and the possibility of overload with heavy traffic on larger networks.  As 
is the case for any network level security system, NIDS only monitor hosts while they 
are connected to the associated network, leaving mobile devices open to attack while 
offsite and operating on less secure networks.  Offsite infection with malware presents a 
real threat to network security as such devices bypass network firewalls on rejoining 
their home network. 
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Host IDS 
On the host an IDS has access not only to network traffic data, but to all local system 
calls, OS kernel logs, application logs, network equipment logs etc.  Any events 
occurring on the host can be monitored and therefore a host-based IDS (HIDS) has 
more information available to detect attacks.  This could include local network interface 
traffic monitoring as in network-based systems (as is the case for our own agent-based 
network intrusion detection system (see section 3.2.4)). 
The main benefit of HIDS is the availability of more information than network traffic 
alone.  Another benefit is continued protection for mobile devices while offsite and on 
unsafe networks.  As more network devices become mobile, it is expected that the 
number of new attacks threatening mobile devices will also increase.  Thus mobile and 
wireless attack detection techniques will become increasingly important [64].  The 
distribution of protection across the network is another benefit, resulting in shared 
processor and memory requirements across hosts and thus allowing for scaling to larger 
sized networks.  Drawbacks include configuration, updates, installation and bug fixes 
which, when required, will be necessary for possibly hundreds of systems on a network. 
Hybrid IDS 
A hybrid system merges the previous two architectures, providing the benefits of both 
types of system for maximum threat coverage.  An example hybrid system is Prelude 
[65] which aggregates results from a number of systems for analysis at one central 
location, whether host- or network-based. 
Signature-Based Detection 
Another categorisation method for IDS lies in their mechanism for detecting intrusions.  
Rule-based detection, also known as signature detection, matches observations against 
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signatures or rules in a database of known attacks, which in the case of NIDS is in the 
form of network packet sequences or their contents.  Similarly to antivirus signature 
detection, the disadvantages of the approach are that it can only detect known threats 
and the signature database must be kept up to date.  An advantage is the low number of 
false positives, since notifications are based on specific rules.  False positives may still 
arise however through inappropriate or poorly constructed rule files.  An example 
signature-based IDS is Snort [21].  An example Snort rule which attempts to detect the 
SQL slammer worm looks as follows: 
alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 1434 (msg:"W32.SQLEXP.Worm 
propagation"; content:"|68 2E 64 6C 6C 68 65 6C 33 32 68 6B 65 72 
6E|"; content:"|04|"; offset:0; depth:1;) 
This rule specifies that any UDP packet directed towards any internal IP address from 
any other IP address with the contents specified by the „content‟ parameter at the 
particular „offset‟ within the packet results in the associated alert. 
Anomaly-Based Detection 
Anomaly or behaviour-based detection learns how a system usually behaves and 
deviations above a certain threshold from the accepted baseline metrics are considered 
potentially threatening and reported.  Thresholds can be set in terms of CPU usage, 
memory usage, network packet types, user typing rate etc. [66]. An issue with anomaly 
detection is that a system may be maliciously retrained over time by an attacker to 
accept anomalous behaviour as normal, thereby removing the possibility of detection.  
An example tool which can carry out anomaly-based detection is rrdtool [67]. 
It is possible to combine both signature and anomaly-based approaches into a system 
that both monitors for matches to signatures and at the same time investigates behaviour 
patterns.  This approach was taken in development of a system by SRI International 
[68].  Here both benefits and drawbacks of each method are inherited, but the possibility 
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of monitoring for known signatures while still potentially catching new, unclassified 
attacks is provided. 
False Positives & False Negatives 
One problem facing IDS is the volume of erroneous results reported.  False positives 
(false alarms) are alerts generated from benign data by the IDS.  False negatives 
(misses) on the other hand are attacks which are not detected by the IDS.  The main 
requirements of an intrusion detection system are low false positive rate and high true 
positive rate [64].  Many methods have been proposed in order to reduce false positives 
but the issue remains a significant problem [69].  Errors will be common when a system 
is first deployed, but through tuning of rulesets and configuration, can be reduced.  As 
the number of false positives increases, the likelihood of the IDS administrator missing 
actual attacks simultaneously rises.  Decisions on which events warrant a notification 
are in the hands of the administrator and will vary based on the organisation/network in 
question [60]. 
3.2.3 Example Systems 
There are many IDS systems, both open source and commercial available today.  The 
two most popular according to Insecure.org [63] are Snort and Open Source Security, 
Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (OSSEC) [70].  Both of these are free, open 
source systems, performing signature detection at network and host level respectively. 
OSSEC HIDS performs log analysis, integrity checking, root-kit detection, time-based 
alerting and active response.  Architecturally, the system is generally deployed to all 
monitored clients, forwarding alerts to a management station for analysis and is 
marketed as an addition to, not a replacement for NIDS. 
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Snort monitors and performs deep packet inspection of network traffic in real-time in 
order to match patterns set by an administrator.  Rules can be easily updated and can be 
as broad or as specific as desired although modifications have a direct influence on the 
number of alerts generated.  Snort can be set to perform Intrusion Prevention (IP) if 
desired, dropping packets which attempt “unacceptable” behaviour such as stealth 
scanning.  Outputs can be long and difficult to decipher and possible add-ons to aid 
analysis include database visualisation and log file processing tools. 
Packet logging tools may be used to capture network packets, leaving the administrator 
to manually view data for threats.  Logging all packets for manual inspection ensures all 
traffic is caught but manual analysis requires considerable skill.  This approach is not 
practical on a full-time basis due to the volumes of traffic generated by any one device, 
let alone an entire network, but is useful in monitoring for unknown threats or for 
forensic evaluation after an attack.  Popular packet logging tools include tcpdump [71] 
and wireshark [72]. 
Many vendors provide various types of commercial IDS.  Cisco ASA offers hardware 
based IDS/IPS functionality along with many other features. 
3.3  Developing a Host-Based, Web-Enabled, Hybrid IDS 
Firewall logs routinely show evidence of port scans and attempts to connect to non-
running services, especially on untrusted networks such as cybercafé or airport wireless 
networks.  These events, revealing attackers or malware attempting to spread, are often 
overlooked by many users who are unaware of the dangers they face on the Internet.  
IDS attempt to remedy this situation by alerting users to attacks, but for the average, 
untrained user, IDS are usually either overly expensive, overly complicated to install 
and run or both.  Further, with NIDS analysing traffic from one central location, mobile 
devices may move from monitored to unsafe networks and become infected.  These 
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issues are considered and attempts made to rectify them through development of a host-
based, web-enabled hybrid IDS described below. 
This section describes in detail this system [73] and is structured as follows.  In section 
3.3.1 we outline the main requirements of our system at a high level, followed by design 
and implementation details in section 3.3.2.  Results obtained through testing of this 
system are delivered in section 3.3.3.  Future conclusions are presented in section 3.3.4. 
3.3.1 Requirements 
The approach adopted here is to take administration tasks out of the hands of the host 
system user, offloading it to a skilled remote authority by transferring pertinent data 
across the network to an administration server for analysis.  The system also takes the 
approach, unusual in intrusion detection, of providing network traffic monitoring on the 
host in a distributed environment, thereby sharing the task of packet analysis across the 
network.  The system must be lightweight for transparent use by now popular limited-
power mobile devices, while providing an extra level of deep packet inspection by 
incorporating Snort at the server.  Agent processing load is raised only upon instruction 
from the server following detection of a possible threat. 
In the system, users receive feedback on the behaviour of their machine (as seen by 
others) over the Internet.  They are also free to roam with their mobile device, accessing 
the Internet from potentially threatening locations such as cybercafés, removed from the 
safety of protected corporate or home networks while still receiving this feedback.  
User‟s awareness of Internet threats will be heightened by this process due to the new 
visibility of the attacks that they are subjected to, thus contributing to their ability to 
take subsequent steps in protecting themselves and their network (according to OECD 
[20], raising user awareness is a key factor in defeating malware).  The system should 
be simple to install and maintain in comparison to other IDS.  In particular the agent is 
run by unskilled users and therefore transparency is of utmost importance. 
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During development of this system, open source tools should be adopted to enhance 
productivity while avoiding duplication of effort. 
3.3.2  Design and Implementation 
The system is logically divided into agents and server.  This section begins with an 
overview of the system as a whole, followed by descriptions of the agent and server. 
Overview 
Installed on each client is a software agent which monitors its own network traffic (see 
Figure 3.2).  Agents submit only minimal information until faced with a perceived 
threat, in which case more information is submitted.  Administrators use a web interface 
to monitor health of clients and the overall network.  All data sent by agents is visible at 
this web interface where the administrator can also interact with each agent, e.g. to 
update rulesets or to request more detailed monitoring of a particular host based on 
events received. 
In Figure 3.2 we see a typical deployment with desktops, laptops and PDAs on a 
network, each running our agent.  A PDA sends a data packet (event X) to a laptop.  
When the laptop receives this data, our analysis engine may deem it suspicious (more 
on the decision process in section 3.3.2.2) and sends a report to the server where it is 
stored in a database along with results from Snort, to be viewed later by an 
administrator.  Also in Figure 3.2 one of the group of laptops is receiving an update 
from the server, perhaps in response to some perceived threat. 
Users (owners of client machines running our agent software) can also log in to the 
server where they are provided with reports on their machine. 
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3.3.2.2  Agent 
In this section we describe some of the relevant details of the agent‟s design and 
implementation.  Agents submit data to the server for analysis and also receive updates 
from the server. 
Design 
The primary function of the agent software is to monitor its host‟s network traffic and 
report relevant events and packets to the server.  Requirements state that agent software 
must be capable of running on multiple device types.  As such, the agent must be 
simple, flexible and lightweight enough to be ported to PDAs and other resource-limited 
devices. The agent offers no graphical user interface (GUI), instead users connect to a 
web application to receive feedback. 
PDA
PDA
Laptop
Desktop
Laptops
Database
Update
Report (Event X)
Ev
en
t 
X
 
Figure 3.2 - IDS Implementation Displaying a System Under Attack 
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Filtering and Reporting 
Filtering and reporting are the main functions of the agent application.  Figure 3.3 
depicts the decision process implemented by the agent for each inbound packet along 
with the reporting or otherwise which results.  These inbound packets could be in the 
form of TCP, UDP or ICMP traffic and are treated appropriately to the given protocol.  
Decisions for each inbound packet are handled as follows.  
 
 
Inbound packet arrives 
at agent
Pass to server and 
mark as “event”
Pass to server and 
mark as “non-event”
Display events at server. Display non-
events at server only if matching a 
snort signature or rule.
Ignore
Ignore
Is traffic 
whitelisted by 
client rules
Is sender on 
watchlist
Y
N
Y
N
1.
3.
2. Is packet 
part of existing 
connection or 
response to our 
request?
N
Y
 
Figure 3.3 - Agent Decision Tree 
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Decision 1 – Is traffic whitelisted by client rules? 
If certain traffic is allowed (whitelisted) on this client, then the ruleset will reflect this 
and the packet is ignored.  For example, if the client is running a web server on port 80, 
client rules will whitelist traffic to this port and it is therefore ignored and not analysed 
further by the agent software. 
Decision 2 – Is packet part of existing connection or response to our request? 
Traffic which is not whitelisted continues to be analysed.  As will be discussed further 
in section 3.3.2.2.2, connection tracking (stateful packet filtering) is implemented by the 
agent.  For TCP traffic, if a connection is initiated by the client, then subsequent traffic 
on this connection continues for further analysis at decision 3.  If it is not part of an 
existing connection however, the packet is passed to the server and marked as an 
“event”.  In the case of ICMP and UDP traffic, no actual connection is established at the 
transport layer, therefore a response to a request from this host is considered in the same 
fashion as that of a TCP connection.  Incoming traffic not whitelisted by the 
administrator and not solicited by this host is therefore considered suspicious and is 
always sent to the server and marked as an “event”. 
Decision 3 – Is sender on watchlist? 
Decision 3 applies to non-whitelisted packets which are part of an existing connection 
or response to a request made by the client.  The watchlist, as discussed further below, 
is a list of systems held by the agent specifying which clients should be monitored 
closely.  Therefore, at decision 3, if the sender of this packet is on our watchlist, then 
the packet is passed to the server and marked “non-event”. 
Arrival at the Server 
In any IDS, one of the issues with which the administrator is faced is the vast quantity 
of data requiring manual analysis.  In order to minimise the amount of data at the 
administration interface, only events are displayed.  Upon arrival at the server, both 
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events and non-events are passed to Snort for further analysis.  Following Snort 
analysis, events are appended with any extra information.  Non-events which Snort 
categorises as security-relevant are promoted to event status and displayed for analysis, 
otherwise they are ignored. 
Client Rules (Whitelisting) 
Agents possess a list of rules, specifying which traffic should be whitelisted.  Whitelist 
entries can be based on IP, MAC address, protocol, port or any combination of these.  
On initial installation of the system, an agent holds a blank whitelist.  Remote updating 
is carried out by the server to populate the whitelist as necessary. 
Connection Tracking 
TCP, as described in Chapter 2, follows pre-defined mechanisms for connection 
initiation and termination.  By interrogating traffic contents, connections are tracked and 
treated according to their current status as described above.  UDP and ICMP traffic is 
connectionless at the transport layer and therefore is tracked for a particular client based 
on whether the communication was initiated by that client i.e. subsequent return 
communications resulting from outgoing requests are allowed.  Timeouts (based on 
those used by IPTables firewall) along with memory usage thresholds are used to 
remove dormant connections. 
Watchlist 
Agents possess a list of IP addresses known as a watchlist.  Traffic originating from any 
of these addresses is monitored closely.  The aim is to provide more detailed analysis of 
systems which are deemed suspicious.  As described above, details of all packets 
originating from a watchlisted client are sent to the server for analysis, whether or not 
they are part of a locally initiated communication.  Again, each agent begins with a 
blank watchlist which is updated remotely by the server.  This watchlist may be 
configured manually by an administrator or automatically where the server adds to the 
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watchlist any clients which exceed some suspicion threshold, e.g. a client reported 20 
times over a 10 minute period. 
Communication 
In addition to network traffic, agent and server communicate through heartbeats and 
updates.  Heartbeats are messages sent by agents at configurable time periods to notify 
the server that they are currently active.  The server can thereby list each client as 
active, providing the ability to interact with it or, conversely, know that a client has 
gone off-line.  Updates are communicated from server to agent in order to modify 
configuration, whitelist or watchlist. 
Implementation 
Following are some details on how the described software was implemented. 
Communicating with the Server 
Each agent which is online and actively communicating with the server sends 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) based “heartbeat” messages at configurable time 
intervals to advertise availability to the server.  Reported events and non-events are 
marked up and transferred in XML according to RFC specifications for Intrusion 
Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [74] and Intrusion Detection Exchange 
Protocol (IDXP) [75].  Use of these protocols allows for simplified analysis of data and 
also for integration with other systems, e.g. the hybrid IDS aggregator, Prelude which 
allows import and management of IDMEF data (the IDMEF standard was developed 
with the participation of the Prelude team).  Configuration and rule updates from the 
server are similarly specified using XML. 
Stateful Packet Filtering - TCP 
For the agent to function correctly, it must distinguish between traffic that belongs to a 
valid connection and unsolicited traffic.  Below we describe how the agent tracks 
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connections.  For packet capture, WinPCap [76] libraries are employed for their proven 
speed and efficiency.  TCP traffic initiated by the local machine is caught in order to 
detect connection setup and teardown events.  Once a connection is established, traffic 
is allowed since setup has been agreed between both hosts, unless the other party is on a 
watchlist, in which case intermediate traffic is also monitored. 
TCP connections are represented by quadruples of IP address and port numbers of 
machines involved in the conversation.  This combination will always be unique. 
As were detailed in section 2.2.2, there are three distinct stages which a TCP connection 
will go through: 
 New 
Connections which are going through the initial TCP three-way handshake are 
given the „new‟ status. 
 Active 
An active connection has had a valid three-way handshake carried out and the 
two machines involved have agreed to communicate.  Data passing is allowed 
between these hosts. 
 Closed 
A connection which has gone through the TCP connection teardown sequence is 
given a status of „closed‟.  As we shall see below however, we must track 
connections for a short time after they are terminated. 
Connections within these various stages are tracked by the agent software. 
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TCP Connection Tracking Issues and Solutions 
A number of issues, including the following, arose during implementation. 
Solitary SYN Packets 
SYN packets represent the initial step in the TCP connection establishment handshake.  
For this reason a reference to each outbound SYN packet must be stored in order to 
watch for its companion SYN-ACK and ACK packets.  We only track the establishment 
of outbound connections, since inbound ones must be whitelisted; an allowed service 
will be reflected in the agent‟s rules.  A solitary SYN packet which does not provoke a 
responding SYN-ACK could be left in the connection queue with status of „new‟, never 
to achieve „active‟ state.  Such a situation could arise where traffic is dropped or the 
target never replies due to firewalling etc.  To prevent build-up of „new‟ connections, 
we set a timer and clear out any „new‟ connections which are older than the allowed 
timeframe.  To decide on this timeframe we applied the same approach as IPTables 
[77], two minutes. 
Connection Teardown Issues 
It was discovered that different OSes can differ in their handling of connection 
teardown.  To cover this, following some experimentation it was decided to consider 
any FIN packet as ending a connection since all variations of the teardown include at 
least one FIN.  These connections are then moved to a status of „closed‟ but allowed to 
function as active for a period in order to handle subsequent teardown traffic. 
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Figure 3.4 - Abnormal RST Sequence 
RST Issues 
RST packets caused similar issues to FIN 
packets.  An RST packet indicates to the 
receiver that one is not willing to send any 
more data and that the connection should be 
terminated.  However, often data transfers are 
still attempted by the RST recipient on a 
given connection following receipt of an RST 
packet.  Usually this is followed by further 
RST packet transmissions by the original 
RST sender.  Similarly to our solution for 
FIN packets, we maintain the connection for 
a time so that further communications are 
allowed. 
Figure 3.4 demonstrates the problem.  An RST packet is sent by the client to the server 
which responds with three SYN-ACK packets to the same port.  Allowing the 
connection to receive packets for a period following closing solves the problem.  
Yahoo.com is one example of a site displaying this behaviour. 
Stateful Packet Filtering – UDP & ICMP 
With UDP and ICMP no connection is established.  However, should a client machine 
send a UDP request, we need to be ready for the reply in order for it not to be reported 
to the server.  Similarly for ICMP. 
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Connectionless protocols were handled as follows: 
 If the initial communication originates from the host machine, then this first 
outgoing packet causes the “connection” to be flagged as valid and no logging of 
a reply is made. 
 Conversely, when the “connection” originates from a foreign machine, this is 
considered to be suspicious and sent to the server.  
Non-Connection Oriented Tracking Issues 
There were some issues with implementing the tracking of UDP and ICMP.  It was 
decided that any outgoing UDP packet is considered as the start of a connection.  Also, 
having no connection teardown sequence means that we cannot easily discard the 
connection once tracking is no longer required.  The resolution was to keep all UDP 
connections alive until the configurable designated storage capacity is exceeded, at 
which point, the oldest UDP connection is discarded. 
Speed 
As with any IDS, speed considerations become important since a high number of the 
packets passing through a machine‟s network interface card must be inspected.  Hash 
lists were implemented along with specialised collection types to hold data related to 
connections to optimise performance.  For example sorted classes were employed so 
that rather than having to search for the oldest connection, this was always the first one.  
This and other specialised collection classes within the open source C5 generic 
collection library project [78] were used. 
Multithreading was used for further speed enhancements. 
 49 
 
Server 
Server software provides a remote monitoring and administration system for all agents 
across a monitored network.  Here a brief overview of its design and implementation are 
provided
3
. 
Design 
A remote administration interface is provided by the server which provides the 
following functionality to users: 
 
Event Analysis & Response Watchlist Management 
 Examine Events  Configure Threshold Settings 
 Configure Server Rules  
 Configure Client Rules Account Management 
  Add Users 
Client Management  Remove Users 
 Update Client Rules  
 Update Client Configuration Report Management 
  Generate Security Reports 
Table 3-1 - Server Functionality 
                                                 
3
 The author was involved in the server‟s design but not implementation which was carried out by a 
project colleague. 
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Implementation 
The server provides a web-based management console to the administrator, 
implemented in ASP.NET through C# and Ajax, integrating a SQL Server database and 
automatic post-processing of submitted traffic using a local Snort installation.  Figure 
3.5 displays the main web page of the system showing details of events.  Active clients 
are listed on the right, with options and information to the left.  The example in Figure 
3.5 contains an instance of the SQL Slammer worm being reported by Snort. 
 
 
Reports are received from agents and, if they trigger a server-side rule, the 
corresponding action is taken.  The administrator may decide that an event is harmless 
and instruct the client agent(s) to ignore such events in future by updating their 
whitelist.   
 
Figure 3.5 - Server Management Console 
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Figure 3.6 - Client View 
All events are securely logged for non-repudiation and configurable views allow the 
administrator to view events by agent and thus rapidly assess the health of a specific 
client in addition to that of the overall network.  Also, owners of client machines can 
log in to the server and receive feedback on their machine (see Figure 3.6).  This 
feedback details any attacks the client was subjected to and any reports of the client 
acting suspiciously as observed by other agents in the system. 
Events and non-events are passed automatically to the server side Snort installation for 
analysis.  Results from Snort are added to the server database and included for analysis 
on the web interface.  On applying Snort analysis to non-events generated through 
watchlisting, these may be given the status of event if security relevant alerts are 
obtained.  Unless they become events, they will not be displayed, an approach that aims 
to keep the interface uncluttered. 
3.3.3 IDS Deployment and Test Results 
The agent was installed on two machines, one on the School of Computing wireless 
network and one on the School of Computing laboratory network.  Both agents were left 
to run over a period of several weeks.  Each machine was configured with an empty 
whitelist in order for maximum vigilance.  The host machines do not run any services.  
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As is the case with a honeypot, all unsolicited traffic to the machines can therefore be 
regarded as suspicious. 
The DCU internal network is protected by a perimeter firewall and monitored by a 
Snort-based NIDS whose rules are maintained by a third party company.  
Communications with the Internet from within the University network are through 
proxy servers. 
The system was run for the entirety of the month of October 2009 during which time the 
following emerged.   
No Internal Firewalling 
Numerous events were reported to the server from various subnets across the 
University.  Once on any DCU subnet (even open wireless networks) it is possible to 
communicate with any other subnet in the DCU network. 
External probes 
Given that our agents are behind a network firewall, external probes should not reach 
them.  However, 216 external IP addresses showed up in the server database, submitted 
by the agents.  This could mean either that the firewall is configured incorrectly, or that 
internal attackers or malware are spoofing their source address.   
Upon investigating whether external IP addresses were being spoofed internally it was 
found that such spoofing is possible even though an externally source addressed packet 
arriving on an internal interface should be dropped.  Therefore it is possible that some 
probes reporting external source addresses may have actually originated from internal 
machines. 
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On testing from a remote network for receipt of external probes using nmap, it was 
discovered that, although no responses were obtained, a number of packets did in fact 
arrive at their destination for certain scan types. 
 
IP # Probes Ports DShield Reports 
67.228.177.191 182 80, 1024, 3072 798,467 
61.111.114.20 78 61220, 33555 105,948 
208.43.231.120 23 18 different ports 63,672 
208.43.74.141 15 1024 & 3072 62,812 
68.178.232.100 14 1024 & 3072 41,383 
Table 3-2 - Top 5 Reported IPs 
Table 3.2 summarises the top reported IPs and their targeted ports.  DShield [79] is a 
free, online database which correlates firewall log results submitted by volunteer users.  
This data can be used for purposes such as analysis of attack trends, and in our case 
lookup of a particular IP address to discover whether it has been reported as attacking 
other machines.  As we can see, each of these source IP addresses is reported as having 
attacked a high number of systems across the Internet.  All of the top 10 and 54% of the 
total 216 external IP addresses were reported a number of times to DShield.  Three of 
the top five IP addresses above probe port 1024 which is often utilised by backdoor 
applications such as NetSpy [80] and MyDoom [81].  Again, firewalls should block 
these external probes.  Probes were seen to a total of 234 ports.  Some ports had as few 
as one but others had up to 900 probes targeted towards them. 
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Internal Probes 
13 internal source IP addresses were reported to the server, varying in numbers of 
reports from 1 to 5405.  These probes may be due to malware, may be the result of 
active network reconnaissance by internal users or may be due to misconfigured 
network services. 
900 probes target port 161, a port associated with SNMP.  Given clients are not running 
an SNMP server, this activity is suspicious in itself, but moreso given the inherent 
dangers associated with the SNMP protocol [82].  All of these SNMP probes arrive 
from a single host which is not attached to the computing domain and are classified by 
Snort as „non-standard-protocol‟ or „attempted-recon‟. 
Attempted Malware Infections 
Not only is external traffic reaching internal machines, but it is attempting to infect 
them.  One interesting discovery provided by Snort analysis was 63 instances of the 
Slammer worm [83] attacking our client machines.  Figure 3.7 displays an instance of 
Slammer being detected by Snort.  Since infection proceeds over UDP, no connection 
need be established making this attack particularly dangerous.  Here a geo IP database is 
used to identify the source of the attack as China. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 - Slammer Detected 
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Further Results Generated from Snort Feedback 
Table 3.3 summarises Snort feedback along with the number of instances of each: 
Snort Feedback Num Results 
NULL 6868 
BAD TRAFFIC Non-Standard IP protocol 1066 
ICMP PING 154 
WORM - W32.Slammer Propagation 63 
SNMP request udp 30 
ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 6 
ICMP Time-To-Live Exceeded in Transit 3 
BAD-TRAFFIC tcp port 0 traffic 1 
ICMP PING NMAP 1 
Table 3-3 - Snort Feedback 
“NULL” represents instances where Snort provided no feedback.  Such events are 
simply marked “Unsolicited Traffic” by the server. 
3.3.4  Conclusion 
Deployment of the prototype on the DCU campus network has already yielded some 
interesting results which could prove useful for improving network security.  We can 
see that a serious vulnerability seems to exist which allows probes through the firewall 
and also internally there is no firewalling across subnets.  The presence of external 
probes on the network has been flagged to network administrators. 
We cover possible future extensions in Chapter 6. 
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3.4  Summary 
Having described some of the network security defences currently available, our own 
implementation of intrusion detection was presented, including design and development 
details.  The system was deployed and tested on the DCU network and some interesting 
results reported. 
Given the vulnerabilities identified through testing our IDS, there is a case for network 
security assessment of the DCU network.  We discuss how the network security process 
is typically carried out in Chapter 4 and present results of analysing the DCU network in 
Chapter 5. 
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4. Network Security Assessment 
Having established in the last chapter that some potential insecurities exist in the DCU 
campus network, a full network security assessment is warranted.  In this chapter we 
describe the means by which network security assessment is carried out.  Results of this 
analysis are presented in the following chapter. 
This chapter is structured as follows.  In section 4.1 we begin with an introduction to the 
field of network security assessment.  In section 4.2 we detail a selection of the steps 
involved in a general assessment including gathering publically available data, scanning 
the network, assessing remote services, assessing web servers and web applications and 
finally assessing email servers.  In section 4.3 we introduce some of the main tools that 
help in the process before ending with a summary in section 4.4. 
4.1  Introduction 
Network security assessment, also known as “penetration testing” or “ethical hacking”, 
replicates the activities of attackers in order to discover weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
within networked computer systems.  The aim is to uncover vulnerabilities before an 
intruder exploits them for denial of service, theft or destruction of data etc.  After the 
assessment process, any findings may then be flagged to the system or network 
administrator who can then apply corrective measures. 
The three main approaches to security assessment are flaw hypothesis [84], attack tree 
[85] and formal methods [86].  Within this section we describe these approaches along 
with legal, corporate and practical issues related to the field of network security 
assessment. 
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4.1.1   Assessment Approaches 
According to McDermott [87], the first published reference to “penetration testing” was 
by R. R. Linde [84].  His paper detailed the idea of a „flaw hypothesis‟ methodology 
where the software system under investigation is examined in order to identify possible 
threats.  All design, development and user documentation are investigated along with 
code, in search of potential flaws.  The same idea can be translated to network 
penetration testing where instead of software analysis, all available information relating 
to network infrastructure is collated and investigated. 
Another security assessment approach uses attack trees [88] to graph attack scenarios.  
The root node represents the overall attack goal with paths from leaf nodes to the root 
describing particular attacks.  Each node may have an associated cost, representing the 
resources required by the attacker to implement that step in the attack. Software exists 
for automating creation of attack trees e.g. Amenaza [89]. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 (from [90]) – Attack Tree showing ways to Burglarise a House 
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Figure 4.1 (from [90]) shows an example attack tree where the overall goal is 
burglarising a house.  To implement the attack tree approach in the context of network 
security assessment we may begin with a top node of „Data Compromise‟ or „Network 
Intrusion‟ which is then similarly decomposed.  Each of these scenarios is tested to 
provide a documented, structured approach to the security assessment process. 
Formal methods [91, 92] are another method of structuring an assessment.  In such 
approaches, a model based on the organisation‟s own security policy is constructed, 
with a formal description language used for policy specification. The model contains 
information about system entities, their current state and the possible transitions 
between states.  The aim is to prove that the system cannot enter an insecure state. 
4.1.2   Issues to Consider in Network Security Assessment 
Issues which arise in the area of network security assessment are introduced here.  
Legal, corporate and practical issues that must be borne in mind before conducting an 
assessment are reviewed. 
Legal Issues 
In order to avoid legal complications, all planned assessment activities including IP 
address ranges, types of attacks to be conducted etc. must be documented in advance 
and signed by management and the assessment parties.  Irish computer crime is covered 
by the Criminal Damages Act 1991 [93] and the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud 
Offences) Act 2001 [94]. 
Corporate Issues 
The value of a security assessment to a company can be difficult to measure in that there 
may be no tangible outcome besides feedback on whether the network is considered 
„secure‟ [95].  Whereas being „secure‟ means a system is safe from threats, security 
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compliance means the system conforms to a given set of security requirements [96].  
Compliance provides assurance that a certain level of security has been achieved.  This 
compliance can be required by government legislation, industry standards organisations 
or an organisation‟s own policies.  Major standards with which companies may be 
required or choose to comply include: 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
The United States Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) [97] 
“provides a framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls 
over information resources that support Federal operations and assets”.   
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [98] 
This international standard must be adhered to by any company which handles credit 
card data.  Development of the standard was initially pushed mainly by MasterCard 
International Inc. and Visa U.S.A. Inc.  Compliance requires encrypted data transfers, 
logical and physical access controls, activity monitoring and logging and relevant to this 
thesis, regular monitoring and testing of networks. 
ISO/IEC 27000 Series [99] 
Delivered by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), these standards cover information 
security management, risks and controls including those of computer networks.  The 
recommendations are broad in scope in order to be applicable to many different types of 
companies. 
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Practical Issues 
Many of the tests performed within a general security assessment can have dangerous 
ramifications for the stability of the system being tested.  For example, if we test for a 
vulnerability which could shut down the computer, a successful test could cause denial 
of service.  This test should therefore never be carried out in a functional production 
environment but would be a very useful undertaking before a system goes live.  Even 
after a network security assessment has been carried out and relevant updates made in 
response to any results, security is not guaranteed.  The most rigorous assessment can 
only cover known attacks, leaving new, “zero-day” exploits as an unforeseeable threat 
until they become publically known and can be defended against. 
4.2   Assessment Methodology 
For this section we follow the flaw hypothesis approach given its prevalence.  We also 
incorporate, to an extent, the technical guidelines for information security testing and 
assessment provided by NIST [100].  A five step process is followed.  In step 1, target 
information is gathered through online, public domain sources before applying this 
information to scan the network in step 2, which can glean information related to 
machines and services accessible on the network.  The workings of some of the most 
popular scan types are explained.  Using results from step 2, remote services are 
assessed in step 3.  Web servers and finally email servers are examined in steps 4 and 5 
respectively. 
4.2.1   Step 1: Gathering Target Information 
This first step involves gathering public information related to the target network from 
the Internet.  The aim is to develop a picture of the target network. 
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Public Websites 
Internet search engines [101] are used to locate the organisation‟s websites, along with 
those of any subsidiary, parent, auxiliary and associate companies.  On company 
websites, we may find: 
 Related companies or entities  Addresses 
 Contact names and email addresses  Phone numbers 
 Network (wireless and wired) information  Merger or acquisition news 
Such information can be used for social engineering attacks.  Email addresses may also 
be harvested for spamming.  Downloading the entire corporate website can be useful in 
order to run fast local searches for useful information.  Often a site‟s HTML and client-
side script contains extra information in the form of comments, hidden fields etc. 
Details of wireless and/or wired networks available in the company office are 
sometimes available on the Internet.  This information can facilitate gaining access 
through plugging into a network within the building or attaching to a wireless network 
from outside, possibly bypassing routers, firewalls, IDS systems etc. 
Online newsgroups and forums can be a source of information about users and servers 
from a particular domain.  Threads on network setup issues and questions posed by a 
company‟s network administrators can reveal valuable information. 
DNS 
DNS registration details for a particular company may contain useful information.  
Contact details for associated administrators along with postal addresses for the 
organisation are usually provided and can be looked up using tools such as whois. 
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A company may operate its own DNS servers.  Several servers are often used for 
redundancy – one primary and several backups which are synchronised through zone 
transfers.  Zone transfers should only occur between specified machines i.e. DNS 
servers for the particular network.  Where an attacker can successfully carry out a zone 
transfer, much sensitive information about network internals is revealed. 
Reverse DNS brute force attacks can also reveal much valuable information.  Here the 
attacker knows the IP address range held by the target and can ask its DNS for a 
hostname for each address in the range.  DNS should be configured only to resolve 
externally accessible hostnames, keeping internal hostnames private but often they are 
not. 
If the target network is large enough, it may have its own AS (autonomous system) 
identification number for use with BGP routing.  BGP separates networks and groups of 
Internet addresses into AS which communicate across the Internet backbone.  AS are 
usually under the control of a company, university (for example DCU falls under 
HEAnet AS1213) or service provider.  AS numbers and related information can be 
located and used to discover IP ranges and neighbouring network information [102]. 
4.2.2   Step 2: Network Scanning 
Once a set of IP addresses has been determined using techniques outlined above, the 
network itself can be explored.  The goal of scanning is to discover accessible hosts, 
services, and firewall configurations. 
Scans involve firing packets at networked machines and listening for a response.  Many 
scanning approaches exist and there are tools available to implement each.  Often a 
different scan type returns different information so the choice depends on requirements.  
Scanning is often carried out using free software such as nmap (see section 4.3.2). 
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Figure 4.2 - ICMP Scan 
Scan results for a given port may be one of „open‟, „closed‟, „filtered‟ and 
„open|filtered‟, depending on the scan type.  „open‟ tells us that the given port is hosting 
a service with which we can interact from our present location.  „closed‟ means that this 
port is reachable but offers no service.  „filtered‟ means that access to the port appears 
blocked by a firewall and we cannot tell whether it is hosting a service or not, but we 
can tell that the firewall administrator does not want us to have access to this port.  
„open|filtered‟ tells us that the port appears either „open‟ or „filtered‟ but nmap cannot 
be certain from the response, however combining this result with that of another scan 
type may generate a definitive result. 
Following is a list of the main scan types along with their specific implementation 
details.  We begin with simple connectionless types before describing TCP connection 
oriented scans. 
Simple Scanning Methods 
These scans employ protocols which, while being simpler in nature than their 
connection-oriented counterparts, have their own idiosyncrasies which we note below. 
ICMP Scan 
ICMP echo, timestamp, information, address mask and router solicitation requests 
invoke a response from their target.  A 
response depends on whether the particular 
device is configured to respond and whether 
these message types are allowed on the target 
network. 
The „ping‟ application is available on all 
major OSes for sending echo request packets.  
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Figure 4.3 - UDP Scan 
Other request packets may be sent using specialised software.  ICMP does not have the 
port abstraction associated with UDP and TCP and therefore this scan, as seen in Figure 
4.2, can only discover whether a system is alive.  ICMP is often blocked at network 
border firewalls so when scanning from outside a correctly configured network this scan 
type is unlikely to be successful. 
UDP Scan 
UDP is a connectionless protocol which, while not comprising as much of the Internet‟s 
overall traffic throughput as TCP, is increasing in volume with the recent popularity of 
P2P and streaming technologies [37].  There are limitations to this scan and therefore at 
times it is overlooked by security assessors.   
As seen in Figure 4.3 (A), a UDP 
response to a UDP request 
indicates an open port.  Most UDP 
implementations respond with an 
ICMP unreachable error from 
closed ports as in Figure 4.3 (B).  
The UDP standard does not require 
a response from an open port and a 
filtered port may similarly generate 
no response.  Nmap will thus 
classify a lack of response as 
„open|filtered‟ as in Figure 4.3 (C), 
meaning that the port could be 
open and simply not responding due to inappropriate packet payload or filters are 
preventing delivery of the UDP packet. 
 66 
 
1. SYN
2. SYN/ACK
1. SYN
A. Open
B. Closed
2. RST
3. ACK
connect() == true
connect() == false
Ta
rg
et
Ta
rg
et
Scanner
Scanner 4. RST/ACK
C. Filtered
2. ICMP Unreachable
1. SYN
(or no response)
Ta
rg
etScanner
 
Figure 4.4 - Connect Scan 
Speed is an issue for UDP scans.  For each unresponsive port, the scanner must wait for 
a timeout to expire.  The problem is that ICMP port unreachable errors are often rate 
limited.  Methods of increasing speed include scanning multiple hosts in parallel or 
lowering the timeout value, thereby skipping slow hosts. 
Furthermore, the simple, connectionless UDP protocol, unlike TCP does not guarantee 
packet delivery.  ICMP port unreachable messages also offer no guarantee of arrival.  
For these reasons packets may be lost resulting in both false positives and negatives.  
Retransmission of packets is typically implemented to counteract this issue. 
TCP Scanning Methods 
Here we look at the more complicated connection-oriented transport protocol of TCP 
and some scanning methods which it makes available. 
Connect Scan 
This scan type does not rely on low 
level raw packets but instead utilises 
the OS provided „connect‟ system call 
to attempt connection establishment 
as seen in Figure 4.4.  Responses take 
the form of the system call‟s return 
value rather than network packets.  
The scanning application does not 
have the same level of control 
compared with low level raw packet 
methods.  Also, this method is not stealthy as any full connections created are often 
logged at the server.  More packets and more time are required than for other scan types.  
The half-open scan below can obtain the same information without most of the 
drawbacks associated with creating a full connection. 
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Figure 4.5 - SYN Scan 
SYN Scan 
A TCP packet with the SYN flag set is 
sent to the target.  This mimics the first 
step in TCP connection setup [39].  The 
scanning application listens for 
responses and, as seen in Figure 4.5, 
understands SYN/ACK to indicate open 
ports (A), RST to indicate closed ports 
(B) and a lack of response or an ICMP 
unreachable packet sent by a firewall to 
indicate a filtered port (C).  SYN 
scanning is also known as half-open 
scanning since the scanning machine never responds with the third part of the TCP 
handshake and the connection is not fully set up.  This means that the connection may 
not be logged by the target system, adding a degree of stealth compared to the connect 
method.  Nmap sends an RST packet which resets the session on receipt of the 
SYN/ACK.  
This scan type is fast with the possibility of probing thousands of ports per second.  
Simplicity of response (or lack thereof) interpretation is another advantage.  SYN scan 
will be consistently reliable as it relies on TCP protocol standards that cannot be altered 
by the particular operating system being scanned. 
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Figure 4.6 - ACK Scan 
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Figure 4.7 - Window Scan 
ACK Scan 
ACK scanning is used only to 
discover firewall rulesets and 
lists ports as filtered or 
unfiltered.  As seen in Figure 
4.6, a TCP packet with the ACK 
flag set is sent to the target host.  
If the packet arrives (A), in 
keeping with RFC 793 an RST 
packet is returned in response.  
The port is regarded as unfiltered although whether open or closed is not known.  Non-
responsive ports or those which return ICMP messages are listed as filtered (B). 
A variation of the ACK scan 
is known as Window scan.  
When a responding RST 
packet is received, the TCP 
window field is examined as 
seen in Figure 4.7.  In certain 
OSes the RST packet‟s 
window field will contain a 
non-zero value if the port is 
open (A) and zero if closed 
(B).  Unfiltered ports in these 
cases can be listed as open or closed. 
Results, however, are not always reliable.  The „certain operating systems‟ mentioned 
above represents a small number of systems and on typical systems this scan will 
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Figure 4.8 - FIN Scan 
consider all ports closed.  Further investigation is required in order to determine 
whether results are accurate.  For example, a mix of closed and open ports indicates a 
system is most likely susceptible to the window method.  Conversely, a system with all 
ports showing open or closed is most likely not vulnerable to window scanning. 
TCP Scan without SYN, RST or ACK bits set 
The TCP standard states that if the 
destination port state is „closed‟, an incoming 
segment not containing an RST causes an 
RST to be sent in response.  It also states that 
if the destination port state is „open‟ and the 
packet has none of the SYN, RST or ACK 
bits set the segment should be dropped.  
Thus, in RFC compliant systems, as seen in 
Figure 4.8, a packet with no SYN, RST or ACK bit set will provoke an RST response 
from closed ports (B) and no response from open or filtered ports (A).  Any 
combination of other flags will produce the same effect.  Nmap‟s NULL (no flags), FIN 
(FIN flag only, as seen in Figure 4.8) and Xmas (FIN, PSH and URG flags) scans are 
variations on this approach. 
The main benefit to the security assessor is their ability to bypass certain non-stateful 
firewalls and packet filtering routers (although some IDS systems can be configured to 
detect these scans).   
Indirect Scanning Methods 
Three main methods of indirectly scanning hosts are possible [103].  Such approaches 
offer a high degree of stealth as the scanning machine never communicates directly with 
the target; instead it arranges to have another machine undertake this function and 
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Figure 4.9 - Zombie Scan 
gathers any results obtained.  The scanned machine therefore sees the intermediate host 
as the source of any packets it receives. 
Zombie Scan 
In a Zombie scan (a.k.a. “idle” or 
“dumb” scan) a remote host (the 
„zombie‟) is probed for the numerical 
identification field from the Internet 
Protocol packet header which is used 
to uniquely identify fragments of an 
original IP datagram.   This number is 
often predictable in being 
incremented for each IP packet sent.  
See step 1 in Figure 4.9.  Next the 
target host is sent a TCP SYN packet, 
spoofed to the zombie machine‟s IP 
address (step 2).  If a packet was sent to the zombie (step 3) in response to the spoofed 
packet, then an RST packet will be sent to the target by the zombie (step 4), 
incrementing the IP ID.  Then the zombie machine is again probed for its IP ID (step 5).  
Since the IP ID is incremented per packet, an increase of two between probes may 
reveal the target machine‟s SYN/ACK in response to the spoofed probe. 
The zombie scan has the benefit that a wide range of operating systems produce 
predictable IP ID sequences and can be exploited in this way, although the latest 
versions of Linux, Solaris and OpenBSD have corrected the issue [104].  A further 
requirement for success is that the zombie must also have relatively low traffic 
throughput at the time of scanning, otherwise its IP ID will be caused to increment by 
other processes.  Even when traffic is low, a number of attempts for each port are 
necessary to be certain of its state. 
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Figure 4.10 - FTP Bounce Scan 
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Figure 4.11 - Sniffer Scan 
FTP Bounce Scan 
The next indirect scanning method is the FTP 
Bounce Scan.  Here FTP systems with 
vulnerable settings are manipulated to scan a 
target through usage of the „PORT‟ command 
(CVE-1999-0017).  As we will see in section 
5.7.1.1, three DCU servers are vulnerable to 
this misconfiguration weakness.  Depicted in 
Figure 4.10, a vulnerable server acts as an 
intermediate proxy for any packets sent to it 
(step 1), passing each to the target (step 2).  
These messages contain the source IP address of the vulnerable FTP server and the 
target sees all packets as originating there.  The target replies to the vulnerable server 
(step 3), which forwards the response to the scanner (step 4).  Besides masking the 
packet origin, this method also allows an attacker to access targets blocked by a firewall 
but accessible to the vulnerable server.  Another similar method is the proxy bounce 
scan which similarly takes advantage of an incorrectly configured proxy server to carry 
out the scan on behalf of a scanner. 
Sniffer Scan 
A final indirect method, the Sniffer 
Scan, captures network traffic destined 
for an intermediate „zombie‟ machine 
to view responses to spoofed packets.  
Root access to a machine on the same 
network segment as the target is 
required.  Consider a simple Ethernet 
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LAN.  Each machine can see the reply to the spoofed packet but unless they are the 
specified recipient, the packet is ignored.  However, packet sniffers such as Wireshark, 
working with a network card in promiscuous mode can capture all packets.  The scanner 
sends a packet to the target with the source address spoofed to that of any other machine 
on the network segment (a „zombie‟) as in Figure 4.11 (step 1).  If the target machine 
transmits a response to the zombie (step 2) the scanner sees it (step 3), and therefore can 
tell whether ports on the target are open or closed. 
On a switched network, an extra step is required.  Address resolution protocol (ARP) 
[33] tables within the switch keep track of which host resides on which port and packets 
are transmitted only to the port held by the intended destination machine.  However, 
ARP redirection can be used to distort the switch‟s ARP tables, causing packets which 
are intended for the zombie to be sent to the scanning machine instead.  Another 
approach is to overload the switch‟s ARP tables which may result in the switch 
reverting to hub-like functionality and transmitting messages out all ports.  Sniffing may 
thus be possible in a switched environment. 
Indirect scan methods provide the highest possible level of stealth. 
4.2.3   Step 3: Assessing Remote Services 
Networked operating systems can support a number of remote information services 
which deliver information over a network connection.  Having discovered a number of 
these services across the target network during step 2, an assessment of their security is 
now carried out.  Some may divulge information of interest to an attacker; others may 
be insecurely configured, out of date and/or contain vulnerabilities.  Services which 
could be exploited by attackers should be removed or updated as required.  Table 4.1 
lists commonly available services along with the ports and protocols on which they run. 
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Acronym Name Port 
Wins Windows Internet Name Service 42/tcp 
domain Domain Name System 53/tcp 
domain Domain Name System 53/udp 
auth Authentication Service 113/tcp 
ntp Network Time Protocol 123/udp 
snmp Simple Network Management Protocol 161/udp 
ldap Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 389/tcp 
ldaps Secure (over SSL) LDAP 636/tcp 
Table 4-1 - Common Remote Services 
Standard tools associated with a particular application protocol can often be used to 
glean information from the above services.  Under some circumstances, protocols may 
be exploited to allow command execution or exposure of sensitive data.  Up-to-date 
patching of all networked software is vital to avoid exposing vulnerabilities.  Simple 
Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is one example of an application layer 
technology used to retrieve/configure network device settings.  Hardware and software 
versions and configuration information for the device can be retrieved from its 
„management information base‟ using SNMP.  Known for its high number of 
insecurities [82], SNMP is still widely used and can be a rich source of information to 
an attacker when accessible. 
4.2.4   Step 4: Assessing Web Servers and Web Applications 
Given their widespread deployment, both web servers and the web applications they 
serve deserve specific attention when assessing network security.  For this reason we 
take the web server installations discovered in step 2 for further investigation.  
Technologies in web site hosting are often complex, with many configuration 
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parameters available to the administrator.  Further complexities arise through the 
interaction of numerous web programming and markup languages.  User input and 
output validation are essential to secure web applications from SQL injection and cross 
site scripting attacks.  Scope for error is considerable and the wide popularity of the web 
and web applications means they have become a favourite attack vector for hackers. 
OWASP 
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [105] is an international security 
community created with the intention of improving general web application security 
through the free and open cooperation of security experts around the world.  OWASP 
provides online security training, mailing lists, research papers, security assessment 
challenges etc.  OWASP provide a „top ten list‟ which represents a documented 
consensus on the ten most significant web application security flaws.  This list is a good 
starting point for web application security assessment and can be used to steer the 
assessment process towards which flaws to look for. 
OWASP Top Ten List (2010 release candidate 1 [106]) lists the following: 
1. Injection 
2. Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 
3. Broken Authentication and Session Management 
4. Insecure Direct Object References 
5. Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 
6. Security Misconfiguration 
7. Failure to Restrict URL Access 
8. Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards 
9. Insecure Cryptographic Storage 
10. Insufficient Transport Layer Protection 
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Testing Mechanisms 
Web proxy applications, e.g. Paros [107] and Web Scarab [108] are very useful for web 
application vulnerability assessment.  Such applications sit between browser and 
Internet, and allow the capture and manipulation of all incoming and outgoing web 
requests and responses.  This allows viewing and modification of parameters which may 
not be available at the browser interface.  Web servers themselves may also have 
configuration errors or vulnerabilities which could be exploited by attackers.  Automatic 
web server scanning tools, e.g. Nikto [109], can aid in their detection. 
4.2.5   Step 5: Assessing Email Services 
Given the ubiquitous nature of email, email services deserve some specific attention.  
Email services located within step 2 ought to be investigated further.  Many companies 
rely on this simple and flexible form of communication to carry out routine business 
and often open this interface on their network to the outside world.  Following are the 
main email protocols: 
 
Acronym Name Port 
smtp Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 25/tcp 
pop2 Post Office Protocol version 2 109/tcp 
pop3 Post Office Protocol version 3 110/tcp 
imap2 Internet Message Access Protocol version 2 143/tcp 
smtps Secure Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (over SSL) 465/tcp 
submission Mail Submission Agent 587/tcp 
imaps Secure Internet Message Access Protocol (over SSL) 993/tcp 
pop3s Secure Post Office Protocol version 3 (over SSL) 995/tcp 
Table 4-2 - The Main Email Protocols 
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A number of applications implementing these protocols have had vulnerabilities.  The 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) Common Vulnerabilities Exposure (CVE) 
(described in section 4.3.1) can be searched for weaknesses in such applications once 
the version number is known.  Email server applications often run with elevated 
privileges so access resulting from any vulnerability could allow an attacker privileged 
control. 
Insecure configuration is again an issue here.  The first Internet worm, the „Morris 
Worm‟ of 1988 [110], spread by exploiting debug functionality (which should be 
disabled) in the sendmail server.  Common issues with email servers include the 
following: 
 Providing too much information in banners e.g. software versions. 
 Insecure configuration can allow servers to function as „open relays‟ allowing 
spammers to spoof messages from any source to any destination. 
 The „EXPN‟ and „VRFY‟ commands may be used to enumerate local users‟ 
email addresses.   
 Insufficient login security allowing brute-force password attacks on accounts. 
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4.3   Network Security Assessment Resources 
This section describes a selection of resources available to security assessors and 
attackers alike. 
4.3.1   Common Vulnerability Exposure  
Launched in 1999, the Mitre Corporation CVE (Common Vulnerability Exposure 
Database) [111] is a list of information security vulnerabilities.  This allows for a 
common reference method for describing and cataloguing specific vulnerabilities.  
Currently 300+ products and services and 150+ organisations are using the system.  One 
tool using CVE is Nessus (section 4.3.3).  All vulnerabilities within a tested system are 
listed in Nessus reports, along with a corresponding CVE number, where available.  
This can be used to index the official CVE web site to find more information, related 
vulnerabilities, tools and techniques for exploitation etc. 
4.3.2   NMap Network Mapper 
Originally created by Gordon Lyon (a.k.a. Fyodor) and released in September 1997, 
nmap network mapper [11] is a highly versatile, free, open source, cross-platform tool 
comprising among its many functions, host discovery, port scanning, service version 
detection and operating system detection.  While offering many advanced configuration 
options, a default scan is very simply initiated and often extremely effective.  The list of 
default ports to be scanned is based on research into the most common Internet services 
carried out by Fyodor.  Its ease of use has also added to the popularity of the tool. 
4.3.3   Nessus Vulnerability Scanner 
The Nessus scanner [112] can be used to test systems for vulnerabilities, 
misconfigurations, denial of service weaknesses and information leakage.  Both safe 
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non-obtrusive and potentially dangerous tests can be executed, a fact that must be borne 
in mind during scan configuration, especially in a live, production environment.  While 
charging companies licence fees, Tenable Network Security distribute a free version for 
personal use.  New plugins are regularly added to test for the latest vulnerabilities.  As 
stated above, Nessus uses CVE to identify vulnerabilities reported where available. 
4.3.4   Metasploit  
“Metasploit provides useful information to people who perform penetration testing, IDS 
signature development and exploit research” [113].  The freely downloadable 
Metasploit Framework aids development and execution of exploit code against a target 
OS or application.  The Metasploit Opcode Database provides information on machine 
language opcodes for use in exploit writing.  The Shellcode Database contains a 
selection of assembly language payloads for use in, for example, buffer overflow 
exploits. 
4.4  Summary 
Following an introduction to the field of network security assessment and some 
associated issues, a five step assessment methodology was outlined.  This process 
begins with gathering of public information, followed by scanning of the network for 
available computers and network services.  Information gathered in these steps is used 
to initiate assessments of remote services including web servers and web applications 
and finally email services.  A selection of network security assessment resources was 
then described. 
The following chapter uses processes and resources outlined in this chapter to provide a 
network security assessment of the DCU campus network, then delivers an analysis of 
results. 
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5. Implementing Network Security Assessment 
In this chapter we present the results of applying the network security assessment 
procedures described in the previous chapter to the Dublin City University campus 
network.  This investigation follows on from the issues brought to light by our IDS and 
described in Chapter 3.  Our primary aims were firstly to discover what, if any, attack-
enabling information is being leaked and secondly to identify any exploitable 
weaknesses or vulnerabilities on the network. Based on these findings a set of security-
enhancing recommendations is made.  All assessment was carried out from an external 
network. 
The chapter is structured as follows: In section 5.1 an overview of the campus network 
is presented.  This is followed in section 5.2 by a review of publicly available 
information on the network.  In section 5.3 internal DNS is examined as a potential 
source of information leakage. Network scanning techniques are then applied to 
determine what machines and services are externally accessible in section 5.4.  Email 
and web services are assessed in sections 5.5 and 5.6 respectively.  Results of an 
automated vulnerability scan are presented in section 5.7.  The chapter concludes with a 
summary in section 5.8. 
5.1  Network overview 
DCU operates two centrally administered campus-wide networks: a traditional LAN 
and an open wireless network. These networks provide students and staff with Internet 
connectivity as well as access to a number of internally hosted services.  According to 
network administrators
4
, network defence is provided by a Cisco firewall and a Snort-
                                                 
4
 DCU network administrators were interviewed on 18
th
 January 2008. 
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based intrusion detection system.  This IDS is monitored both internally and externally 
by a third party who also provide configuration and rule updates.  There is no 
monitoring of internal network traffic.  External access to internal services is generally 
restricted and requires the opening of specific IP addresses and port numbers on the 
DCU firewall.  For external connections to the DCU network, Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) technology is used to encrypt traffic. 
In addition to the campus-wide network, a number of Schools and Faculties run their 
own networks including DNS and email services. One example is the School of 
Computing which operates both a switched Ethernet LAN and an open wireless network 
for its staff and students. 
5.2  Public Domain Information 
The starting point in a network security assessment is to determine to what extent 
security-relevant information on the target network is available on the Internet. 
5.2.1  Network details 
Google search revealed that the DCU network is a subset of the HEAnet [114] 
autonomous system (AS 1213).  DCU is given a CIDR (classless inter-domain routing) 
prefix of 136.206.0.0/16, meaning that 16 bits are available for host addressing, 
allowing for up to 65,536 IP addresses on the network.  HEAnet is a high speed national 
academic research network, providing Internet and related services to research and 
educational organisations in Ireland.  HEAnet is connected over 2 x 10Gbps links to the 
Irish Neutral Exchange (INEX) network [115] which connects Irish ISPs.  INEX is 
connected to networks in Europe over a 2.5Gbps link [116]. 
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Figure 5.1 (from [117]) - DCU Wireless Network Access Points 
Details of the DCU wireless network, as shown in Figure 5.1 (from [117]), are also 
publicly available e.g. through a Google search for [site:dcu.ie wireless network].  This 
is an open, unsecured network to which anyone can connect and as noted in Chapter 3, 
once on a DCU subnet, all DCU subnets are accessible. 
5.2.2  Google Groups 
A Google Groups search for [dcu.ie network] revealed a thread [118] concerning a user 
having difficulty connecting a PDA to „laplan‟, the campus-wide DCU wireless 
network.  Responses reveal details of the DCU web proxy server and its ports.  Another 
thread [119] gives further proxy server information including the path to the externally 
available proxy auto-configuration file.  This file contains the names of proxy servers, 
proxy1 and proxy2 along with the port on which they listen.  Such information should 
be on an intranet rather than on the Internet. 
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Senderbase [120] operates a large database of email and web traffic data ratings which 
helps ISPs identify spammers.  On searching Senderbase for 136.206.0.0/16, 29 host IP 
addresses are returned (7 of these accompanied an associated DNS hostname), 4 of 
which are rated as „good‟, 25 rated as „neutral‟.  A neutral rating indicates that no 
definitive decision has been made on the host and it may have some negative reports 
associated with it. 
5.2.3  Staff details 
A Google search for DCU shows the University‟s main web site to be 
http://www.dcu.ie. Available on this web site are all staff details including phone and 
office numbers, role within DCU and email address.  A Google search for [site:dcu.ie 
inurl:staff administrator] returned details of the NT Administrator, NT Support and 
Technical Services Managers. Such information may be useful in social engineering 
attacks and e-mail addresses can be harvested for spamming.  While most email 
addresses take the form firstname.surname@dcu.ie others are 
firstname.surname@departmentname.dcu.ie where the latter indicates the presence of 
an additional, separately administered sub-domain. 
5.2.4  Campus Company Details 
Searching the online Companies Registration Office database (CRO) [121] along with 
the main DCU website reveals numerous campus companies and businesses hosted on 
the DCU network including: 
o Campus Residences Ltd. 
o Digitary 
o The National Centre for Technology in Education (NCTE) 
o Investment Intelligence 
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The subnets associated with such companies should be firewalled from the rest of the 
DCU network if not done so already. 
5.3  DNS Information 
A domain‟s DNS services may be queried for internal IP addresses and machine names. 
If DNS services are not securely configured an attacker can use leaked information to 
map a network and its hosts. Below we examine DCU‟s DNS services for common 
vulnerabilities. 
5.3.1  DNS Interrogation Tools 
The whois tool is used to query DNS databases for information regarding the registrant 
or assignee of a domain name, IP address or AS number.  A whois query can name the 
network administrator and reveal name servers associated with the domain. For DCU 
the name servers are (two of which belong to DCU, three are external but cooperate for 
name resolutions): 
 ns1-ext.dcu.ie 136.206.1.1 
 ns2-ext.dcu.ie 136.206.1.2 
 ns1.tcd.ie 134.226.1.114 (Trinity College Dublin - TCD) 
 auth-ns1.ucd.ie 137.43.1.13 (University College Dublin – UCD) 
 ns5.univie.ac.at (University of Vienna – Universität Wien) 
Additional information returned includes the domain name renewal date of 31 
December 2009.  If this date were missed domain squatters could potentially register the 
DCU domain name and charge the organisation to repurchase it. 
Using the dig utility to query DNS also reveals mail exchangers for the DCU zone as: 
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scan4.dcu.ie (136.206.1.26) scan5.dcu.ie (136.206.1.27) 
We assess email services in section 5.5. 
5.3.2  Searching for Zone Transfer Weaknesses 
According to Kalafut [122] 6.6% of Internet DNS servers are susceptible to external 
zone transfers.  Tools such as „dig‟ can be used to check for zone transfer weaknesses, 
e.g. 
dig @ns1-ext.dcu.ie dcu.ie axfr 
A total of 19 machines within the University were found to have port 53 (DNS) open 
(see section 5.4).  Two of these have zone transfer weaknesses and will return all details 
of their sub-domain, the computing department: 
 nuptse.computing.dcu.ie (136.206.11.249) 
 nuptse2.computing.dcu.ie (136.206.11.243) 
A brief extract from one such zone transfer is presented below: 
bill@London:~$ dig @nuptse.computing.dcu.ie computing.dcu.ie axfr  
computing.dcu.ie.       600     IN      SOA     Mailhost.Computing.DCU.IE.  
computing.dcu.ie.       600     IN      MX      10 mailhost.computing.dcu.ie.    
computing.dcu.ie.       600     IN      MX      50 scan4.dcu.ie.                 
computing.dcu.ie.       600     IN      MX      100 bodkin.nuigalway.ie.         
computing.dcu.ie.       600     IN      MX      120 mxbackup.esat.net.           
computing.dcu.ie.       600     IN      NS      ns2.computing.dcu.ie.            
computing.dcu.ie.       600     IN      NS      ns1-ext.dcu.ie.                  
computing.dcu.ie.       600     IN      NS      mailhost.computing.dcu.ie. 
computing.dcu.ie.       600     IN      A       136.206.11.240                   
alpamayo.computing.dcu.ie. 600  IN      CNAME   mailhost.computing.dcu.ie.       
it.computing.dcu.ie.    600     IN      HINFO   "GATEWAY PC" "Solaris 2.6 x86"   
ampato.computing.dcu.ie. 600    IN      A       136.206.11.32                    
aoraki.computing.dcu.ie. 600    IN      A       136.206.11.231 
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The „SOA‟ (Start of Authority) entry signifies the start of information for a particular 
zone.  Next to be listed are the mail servers „MX‟ and DNS servers „NS‟ entries before 
listing all machines within the zone.  „A‟ entries give the IP address for a particular host 
name, „CNAME‟ entries are aliases associated with a host name.  „HINFO‟ entries give 
hardware details of the machine in question where available.  A total of 172 results were 
returned, as detailed in Table 5.1. 
 
Entry Type  Amount 
A  91 
CNAME  54 
HINFO  18 
MX  5 
NS  4 
Total:  172 
Table 5-1 - Zone Transfer Results Distribution 
A zone transfer weakness represents a serious flaw as it exposes a complete listing of all 
hosts and corresponding IP addresses within the domain to an attacker.  A denial of 
service opportunity is also exposed to an attacker who may make multiple zone transfer 
requests, making the server slow or unresponsive to legitimate requests.  Hardware and 
OS versions leaked may be used to search for vulnerabilities.  A number of instances 
exist of hostnames named after the machine owner which allows for specific targeting 
of individuals. 
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5.3.3  Forward DNS Grinding 
Forward DNS grinding involves submitting host name guesses as DNS queries and 
hoping for a hit i.e. the return of a corresponding IP address indicating the host exists 
within the domain. Identified IP/hostname pairs help in extending the attacker‟s 
network map.  Forward DNS grinding is similar in approach to a brute-force password 
cracking uses a dictionary file consisting of common machine names and attempts 
lookups based on each.  Using txdns [123] to forward grind the DCU DNS servers 
returned 120 machine names for 80 distinct IP addresses (some IP addresses resolve to 
more than one DNS name).  The dictionary files can be continuously augmented with 
extra information found during the discovery process e.g. figures from Greek 
mythology are a recurring theme as are mountain names within the computing sub-
domain. 
5.3.4  Reverse DNS Sweep 
Given a domain‟s IP address range, it is possible to carry out a reverse DNS lookup for 
each of its IP addresses.  ghba [124] is a simple utility which automates this reverse 
lookup process.  For each successful lookup it prints out the corresponding hostname.  
Using this method 740 successful machine name resolutions were made for the DCU 
network.  The results show a number of naming themes (composers, philosophers etc.) 
and we see many machines named after their owners.  This immediately enables the 
attacker to target not only specific IP addresses but also specific individuals. Many 
hostnames were also revealed to be predictable e.g.: 
 intel1.physics.dcu.ie , intel2.physics.dcu.ie, intel3.physics.dcu.ie… 
 PL86.eeng.dcu.ie, PL87.eeng.dcu.ie, PL88.eeng.dcu.ie… 
Such results also allow an attacker to associate departments (physics, electronic 
engineering etc) with subnets.  Knowing which subnets are associated with individual 
departments again helps the attacker build up a detailed view of overall network 
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organisation.  Further, machines in non-technical departments may be specifically 
targeted given a possible lack of local security expertise.  
5.3.5  DNS Summary  
Having obtained a total of 740 distinct hostnames through the ghba reverse DNS sweep, 
120 through forward DNS grinding using txdns and 140 through the School of 
Computing zone transfer, a total of 899 distinct hostnames, associated with 793 distinct 
IP addresses were gathered.   
It is recommended as a security measure that organisations deploy two separate DNS 
servers: one responding to external requests and another handling internal request which 
are not to be shared with the public [122].  As the forward grinding and reverse DNS 
sweeps illustrate, this approach is currently not adopted on the DCU network.  Other 
information provided by DNS tools such as dig and whois is a matter of public record.  
While DCU‟s main name servers are not vulnerable to DNS zone transfers, two internal, 
but externally accessible name servers are vulnerable. This is a serious security 
weakness and should be fixed. 
At this stage we have uncovered much network related information and an overall 
picture of the network is beginning to emerge. 
5.4  Network Scanning 
In this section we report our findings on applying a selection of the network scanning 
techniques detailed in Chapter 4.  Scanning was carried out from an external location in 
order to take the viewpoint of an external attacker. 
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5.4.1  ICMP Scan 
ICMP can be used to discover whether a machine is online or not.  Three types of ICMP 
request are applicable: 
 echo  
 timestamp  
 information  
Nmap was used to carry out the ICMP echo scan while the SING (Send ICMP Nasty 
Garbage) application [125] was used for timestamp and information requests.   These 
scans proved unsuccessful in determining whether machines on the DCU network were 
online. This is not surprising given many firewalls block ICMP traffic and DCU appears 
to be a case in point. 
5.4.2  TCP Port Scanning 
A number of the TCP port scanning techniques described in Chapter 4 were applied 
against the DCU IP address range to determine which hosts are accessible and which 
services they are running.  Here we report and analyse scan results. 
Running a sequential series of scans against DCU‟s class B network is a time-
consuming task.  A number of Linux shell scripts were written in order to run scans in 
parallel, thereby significantly reducing scanning time.  Table 5.2 below shows the scans 
along with the number of hosts which responded to each.  This response may be any of 
open, closed or filtered for at least one port on a particular machine. 
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A total of 481 distinct IP addresses responded to one or more of the scan types.  These 
results do not reveal which services are running but tell us how many machines are 
alive, accessible and worth further investigation.  Results also reveal which scan types 
generate the most results.  We can see above that ACK scans produce the most 
responses.  Although the numbers of responders to window and maimon scans are 
identical, different machines responded to each (albeit with considerable overlap). 
Table 5-2 - Numbers of Responding Hosts per Scan Type 
There were no cases of machines responding to fragmented scans but not to their non-
fragmented equivalent.  Thus fragmenting packets does not evade firewalls 
(fragmentation is often used as a firewall evasion technique) on this network. 
Source Port Spoofing 
As a firewall evasion mechanism, altering the source port on scan can prove a 
worthwhile undertaking.  The chosen ports for our experimentation were 20 (FTP), 53 
(DNS), 80 (HTTP) and 88 (Kerberos).  Each was chosen because it is often allowed 
through firewalls given the ubiquitous nature of the underlying service.  These scans did 
provide some supplementary results.  Scans with a source port of Kerberos were 
allowed past the firewall a significant number of times (47) where no other scan types 
could produce any response (it is unclear why the overall numbers of results obtained 
Scan Responders  Scan Responders 
ACK 315  Fragmented ACK 8 
Window 290  Fragmented SYN 7 
Maimon 290  Fragmented Connect 5 
Connect 271    
SYN 218  SYN Source 20 64 
Null 179  SYN Source 53 92 
Xmas 179  SYN Source 80 64 
FIN 164  SYN Source 88 115 
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by these scans were significantly lower than for SYN scans with default source ports).  
From the defensive perspective we should only open the minimum number of ports in 
the firewall, necessary for normal network functioning. Where possible only traffic 
associated with internally initiated connections should be allowed. 
Scan Results by Host Machine 
As mentioned, port scan results were generated for 481 responding machines in total 
and results for each were aggregated into a spreadsheet for analysis.  For each machine 
a matrix was generated with ports as rows and scan type as columns. 
Analysis included calculating the total number of distinct IP/port responses across all 
machines and scan types.   Results for the top responding ports are graphed below.  
Results for a particular scan on a particular port may be one of „open‟, „closed‟, 
„filtered‟ and „open|filtered‟.  Below we examine the results for both open and filtered 
ports. 
Open Ports 
This first set of results covers the reachable and responding ports to which it is possible 
to connect from outside the DCU network.  A total of 141 distinct ports were listed as 
open on at least one machine across the DCU range.  209 distinct machines reported 
having at least one port open leaving the remaining 272 machines generating one or 
more responses other than „open‟.  It is unclear why the latter machines should be 
externally accessible if they offer no accessible services.  The top 15 most common of 
these open ports are listed in Figure 5.2. 
A number of these protocols can often be interrogated for further information by 
attackers so should be carefully configured to be externally inaccessible and/or to give 
out only a minimum of information.  The large number of open ports, totaling 863 
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across all accessible machines, provides the attacker with an excellent starting point for 
further investigation and possible break-in.  Whether or not each of these ports should 
be open to external connection should be considered and where left open, they should 
be sufficiently protected.  DCU policy should be to close ports after some period in the 
absence of a request (by the owner) to have them kept open.  Such a policy would 
ensure services no longer required are closed down rather than remaining indefinitely 
accessible and running out-of-date software. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It was discovered that the optimal scan type combination for discovering open ports is 
the SYN plus connect scans.  These two account for 855 of the 863 open ports, leaving 
only 8 (0.92%) found by other scan types. 
This combination of scans, with the addition of SYN source 53 spoof scan will receive 
an open response from all available systems on the network as follows: 
 
Figure 5.2 - Common „open‟ Ports 
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Scan Type Number of (distinct) Hosts 
1. connect 190 
2. SYN 17 
3. SYN Source 53 2 
Total: 209 
Table 5-3 - Optimal Scan Combination 
As seen in Table 5.3, the connect scan results in an „open‟ response from at least one 
port on 190 different hosts.  A subsequent SYN scan provides 17 extra hosts which 
were not yet discovered by connect.  The two remaining hosts were discovered through 
a SYN scan with source port spoofed to 53, thereby covering all hosts which have at 
least one „open‟ port. 
Interesting Ports 
An interesting result is the 164 web servers (port 80) accessible to the outside world 
running on the DCU campus.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, web servers and the 
applications they run are often vulnerable to attack.  It is quite possible that a number of 
these servers are no longer used, maintained or patched for the latest security threats.  
These are not „virtual‟, centrally maintained and hosted servers but individual hardware 
and software installations.  See Section 5.6 for more on web server interrogation. 
Protocols known to have security issues associated with them were also revealed.  An 
example is the telnet protocol (TCP port 23) [126], which is running on 24 machines.  
Telnet transmits unencrypted data including passwords from client to server and should 
be replaced by Secure Shell (SSH) [127].  Another example is FTP (TCP ports 20 and 
21) [26], which is running on 34 machines, and also transmits unencrypted data 
including passwords and should be replaced with SFTP (FTP over SSH).  SSH (and 
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SFTP) run on port 23, encrypting logins and passwords along with data while otherwise 
providing the same functionality as their „insecure‟ counterparts. 
Ports 25 (SMTP email servers) [128] and 53 (DNS domain name servers) are required 
to be open within most organisations.  We looked at DNS vulnerabilities in section 5.3 
and in section 5.5 we assess the security of the email servers. 
Interesting ports for attackers can also be those which produce a low but positive 
number of responses.  These may be forgotten, unpopular, rarely used or updated 
technologies which might be vulnerable to attack.  One such example is TCP port 6400 
(crystalreports) which responded as open on one machine only. 
Filtered Ports 
Nmap produces different results from different scan types.  The FIN, Maimon, Null and 
Xmas scans on occasion produce the result „open|filtered‟ as the scan cannot determine 
whether the port is actually open or if it is being filtered by a firewall.  On the other 
hand, the ACK, Connect and SYN scans can deliver the more specific „filtered‟ result 
since they can determine that a port is filtered by a firewall and could not possibly be 
open.  When results are compared, the „filtered‟ results generally correspond to 
„open|filtered‟ results generated by the other scans and therefore our results for both are 
amalgamated into one spreadsheet.  A total of 137 distinct ports were listed as filtered 
or open|filtered across all machines on the DCU range.  The top 15 most common of 
these filtered ports are listed in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 - Common „filtered‟ Ports 
This set of results reveals the protocols which are specifically blocked by firewalls, 
whether these are on particular machines, or across the entire range.  The Microsoft 
Windows service ports figure strongly in these results, since they could be dangerous if 
open to the Internet.  Ports 4662 (edonkey), 6346 (gnutella) and 6881 (bittorrent-
tracker) which represent file sharing protocols known for high network resource 
consumption, thus reducing network throughput for other users are blocked. 
5.4.3  OS Guessing 
An operating system guess scan of the responding machines was carried out.  Results 
were obtained only for a number of them.  Guesses were provided for 224 machines in 
 95 
 
total.  Most were not definitive and listed a number of possibilities.  OS guesses were as 
follows: 
Table 5-4 - Operating System Guesses 
In Table 5.4, „Multiple Guesses‟ indicates nmap was uncertain of the OS in question.  
From these results the DCU network contains twice as many Linux as Microsoft 
devices.  Cisco operating systems also make up a significant proportion of remotely 
accessible hosts with Solaris and other Unix based operating systems making up most of 
the remainder.  Cisco OSes run on routers and switches.  Some may offer a web 
interface for configuration.  On checking for web interfaces to the Cisco systems, one 
was found to be open to the public (Cisco Catalyst 2940 switch - 136.206.178.11), 
allowing access without a password to statistics and configuration updating.  This is 
extremely dangerous as the interface allows an attacker to alter the switch‟s 
configuration, revert to factory settings, allow telnet and SNMP access etc. 
5.5  Email Server Assessment 
DCU‟s email servers, revealed as open port 25 by nmap, were tested with results 
described in this section.  None were found to act as open relays but other issues did 
arise, as described below. 
Guess # Hosts Guess # Hosts 
Multiple Guesses 66 OpenBSD 4 
Linux 58 FreeBSD 3 
Cisco 50 Novell 2 
Microsoft 28 Apple 1 
Solaris  11 Tandberg 
Embedded 
1 
 Total: 224  
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5.5.1  Version Fingerprinting 
On connecting to port 25, information is often returned in the form of a „banner‟.  By 
default this may contain information regarding the specific email server version.  It is 
possible to telnet to port 25 on ten of the fifteen DCU machines running email servers.  
Five report to be using Postfix, but do not specify which version, while two do not 
report the software which they are running at all.  Two mention Microsoft ESMPT mail 
service 6.0.3790.3959 (Exchange 2003).  One reports Sendmail 8.13.8/8.12.5. 
Scanning applications such as smtpscan [129] can reveal information about SMTP 
servers when banners are hidden.  smtpscan tells us that the above mentioned sendmail 
installation is actually version 8.11.6.  On searching the National Vulnerability 
Database, at least three vulnerabilities associated with that sendmail version are 
reported.  Firstly the medium severity vulnerability CVE-2009-1490 describes a heap-
based overflow allowing attackers to cause denial of service and possibly execute 
arbitrary code.  Secondly the high severity CVE-2002-1337 covers a buffer overflow 
allowing arbitrary code execution.  Finally the high severity CVE-2003-0694 allows 
both arbitrary code execution and denial of service.  Further investigation is necessary 
to determine whether the actual sendmail version is that reported by the banner or the 
one reported by smtpscan.  None of the SMTP server applications for which results 
were generated were running the latest version of their particular implementation. 
5.5.2  Local User Enumeration 
On connecting to an open SMTP server, for example through telnet, it is possible to 
enter commands.  The „EXPN‟ and „VRFY‟ commands can be used to enumerate local 
users and should be disabled.  Of the ten servers to which we can connect using telnet, 
eight accepted commands.  Six make available the „VRFY‟ command while only one, 
mailhost.computing.dcu.ie, allows both „EXPN‟ and „VRFY‟.  „EXPN‟ was not 
available on any other SMTP servers.  Both „VRFY‟ and „EXPN‟ can be exploited to 
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Figure 5.4 - HTTP Server Subnets 
efficiently brute force email addresses.  An example of an application which can 
enumerate mail server users using the „EXPN‟ and „VRFY‟ commands is smtp-user-
enum [130]. 
5.5.3  Summary 
User enumeration on the majority of DCU SMTP servers is achievable, with a number 
of these allowing the „VRFY‟ command, one of which also allows „EXPN‟.  These 
commands allow brute force enumeration of users.  Fingerprinting and banner grabbing 
show that SMTP servers should be upgraded to their latest versions. 
5.6  Web Server and Application Assessment 
A crawl of the 164 HTTP servers was made, followed by application of the Nikto web 
server vulnerability assessment tool for further automated inspection. 
As we see in Figure 5.4, the 
majority of available HTTP 
servers are spread over the 
„low‟ and „high‟ range of IP 
addresses and have no obvious 
associated department subnet 
based on hostnames.  The 
remainder comprise of servers 
within the redbrick (a student 
run computer user group in the 
school of computing), 
computing, electronic 
engineering (eeng), physics and cse domains.  Redbrick‟s subnet runs the largest 
obvious grouping of HTTP servers with a total of 22, followed by the School of 
Computing with 15. 
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5.6.1  Manual Web Viewing 
The initial step in any web application assessment is to download and inspect each of 
the front webpages of the 164 web servers discovered earlier.  On carrying out this task 
we discover one Cisco Catalyst 2940 switch whose administration page is available 
over the Internet for viewing and configuration without requiring a password, as 
mentioned in section 5.4.3.  Available options include monitoring of statistics, 
configuration of ports, restarting the device, setting up telnet and SNMP access, and 
restoring default settings.  Two printers are also accessible over the Internet, allowing 
configuration updates, setting up email alerts and restarting the printer to apply these 
settings.  11 servers require usernames and passwords but do not use encryption (such 
as SSL) for data in transit.  Therefore usernames and passwords are sent in clear text 
and can be viewed by anybody sniffing network traffic.  Three servers display a 
directory listing in text based format, allowing the user to see files and folders which 
exist on the server.  Another server provides links to files for download.  On following 
the link to one particular folder, an error message is returned including username „root‟ 
and an associated password.  20 servers, through error messages upon connection 
attempts or otherwise, provide specific details of web server software in use.  Five 
servers display the default test web page for their particular server application, three of 
which further provide details of the operating system in use.  This may also indicate that 
a server/site was installed and subsequently abandoned. 
5.6.2  Nikto Vulnerability Scanning 
The Nikto web server vulnerability scanning tool was run against the 164 HTTP 
servers.  Following are a subset of interesting results obtained. 
Vulnerabilities and Outdated Software 
23 machines were found to be vulnerable to cross site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.  6 
servers are listed as running formmail.pl which has numerous remote vulnerabilities 
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associated with it including file access, information disclosure and email abuse.  
Outdated versions of Apache, IIS and Oracle Application Server are running on 63, 6 
and 1 system(s) respectively.  PHP, mod_ssl, OpenSSL, perl and mod_perl versions are 
outdated on 32, 26, 26, 8 and 10 systems respectively. 
Information Leakage 
98 servers deliver software version numbers through publicly available banners.  76 
systems have a number of accessible files listed as „interesting‟ meaning they may 
contain some information which could be useful to attackers. 
Insecure Configurations 
54 servers allow directory indexing.  61 machines are reported as supporting the HTTP 
TRACE command meaning they are vulnerable to Cross Site Trace (XST) attacks.  
Nine servers allow the „PUT‟ and „DELETE‟ HTTP commands which permit uploading 
and deletion of files respectively.  Of these nine, six also allow the „MOVE‟ command 
which allows moving of files within the server. 
5.7  Automated Network Vulnerability Scanning 
The Nessus network vulnerability scanning tool was run against hosts discovered 
through scanning the DCU network in section 5.4.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, unsafe 
scans were disabled to avoid possible harm to targets.  Output provided us with the 
following information. 
5.7.1  Analysis 
Machines which contain security holes or give rise to warnings or security notes are 
reported on a per host basis within Nessus reports.  Holes are more serious than 
warnings which are more serious than notes.  Possible fixes are also presented along 
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Figure 5.5 - Top 9 Most Vulnerable Services on the Network 
with graphs which are provided to aid result interpretation.  Table 5.5 provides a 
summary of the responses generated by Nessus 
 
Hosts which were alive and responding during test 296 
Number of security holes found 22 
Number of security warnings found 137 
Number of security notes found 2542 
Table 5-5 - Nessus Results Summary 
As seen in Figure 5.5, the most common source of security holes are found in FTP and 
SSH.   
Sample security holes, warnings and notes are discussed in the following sections. 
Security Holes 
Threats with the highest severity, the „security hole‟ (also known as „vulnerability‟ by 
Nessus) have a risk factor of critical or high.  These could result in compromise of the 
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machine or service in question.  Security holes usually have a CVE number associated 
with them and possibly published exploits.  Table 5.6 lists the systems which have the 
highest severity level security „holes‟. 
Table 5-6 - Machines with Security Holes 
One example of a security hole which exists on two machines on the network is CVE-
2008-0166, which describes an issue with weak SSH host keys.  The random number 
generator associated with these cryptographic keys is predictable and exploits exist (e.g. 
[131]) which can pre-calculate possible keys to decrease the time necessary to carry out 
a brute force attack for key retrieval. 
Another example security hole exists in three Internet facing FTP servers.  CVE-1999-
0017 allows an attacker to connect to third party hosts using the PORT command.  The 
attacker can use this vulnerability to bypass a firewall or to carry out an FTP bounce 
scan, as described in section 4.2.2.3.2, where the server is manipulated to scan other 
hosts which see the scan as originating from the vulnerable FTP server. 
Security Warnings 
A „security warning‟ can have a high, medium or low associated risk factor.  These are 
not considered as dangerous as the aforementioned „holes‟ but some nonetheless could 
result in exposure of sensitive data, remote access etc. 
136.206.1.27 136.206.161.116 136.206.178.29 eaccess.rince.ie 
136.206.19.19 136.206.161.181 136.206.222.20 ebt.cse.dcu.ie 
136.206.19.190 136.206.161.234 nuptse.computing.dcu.ie mail.insero.ie 
136.206.160.17 136.206.176.12 pisang.computing.dcu.ie scan4.dcu.ie 
136.206.160.26 136.206.178.4 vinson.computing.dcu.ie  
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Figure 5.6 - Security Risk 
Severity Comparison 
An example which exists on 14 Internet facing DCU hosts is CVE-2008-1483.  This 
issue could allow hijacking of X11 user sessions due to a server port binding error.  
Versions of SSH prior to 5.0 are vulnerable and upgrading is advisable. 
As previously mentioned in section 4.2.3, the SNMP protocol is known to have a 
number of associated issues while providing a rich source of information.  CVE-1999-
0517 describes a predictable community string
5
 taking its default value of „public‟.  Six 
hosts may be vulnerable to this issue allowing attackers to view and modify system 
information. 
Security Notes 
Finally, „security notes‟ provide information 
which may be indirectly useful to an attacker or 
results which are inconclusive and require further 
manual investigation.  Also known as 
informational or low risk threats, as seen in 
Figure 5.6, these constitute 94% of results 
obtained.  This information may take the form of 
identified software and hardware versions, 
hostname resolutions, services accessible etc.  
Usually these are not serious security issues but 
nonetheless can denote exposure of excessive 
system information. 
                                                 
5
 SNMP passwords are also known as community strings. 
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5.7.2 Example - 136.206.160.6 (mail.insero.ie) 
This host is reported as having one security 
warning and two security holes.  These 
particular holes could be leveraged to 
provide the attacker with significant reward.  
Firstly a high risk rated vulnerability in SQL 
Server (port 1433) is present allowing 
arbitrary code execution through a stored 
procedure which does not check parameters 
sufficiently (CVE-2008-5416).  Arbitrary 
code execution opens the possibility of 
spawning a shell on the server and thereby 
taking full control of this system at the 
privilege level held by the vulnerable application.  Following exploit of this issue, an 
attacker could take advantage of various memory corruption flaws in this SQL Server 
version (CVE-2008-0085, CVE-2008-0086, CVE-2008-0106, CVE-2008-0107), which 
allow privilege escalation on the target host.  The attacker now has control with elevated 
privileges.  Neither of these high risk rated issues are associated with any other hosts on 
the network.   
A medium risk rating warning on this host makes it possible for a remote attacker to 
gain access to the machine through the functioning version of Remote Desktop Protocol 
Server (Terminal Services) which is vulnerable to a man in the middle attack (CVE-
2005-1794).  An attacker could exploit this flaw to decrypt client – server 
communications and obtain sensitive information including passwords.  A total of 30 
machines on the network are vulnerable to this particular issue.  11 informational 
messages are also provided for this host. 
 
Figure 5.7 - Severity of Security Risks 
for mail.insero.ie 
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5.8  Summary 
Having discovered foreign traffic and attempted malware infections on the DCU 
network through deployment of our IDS, it was decided that a more thorough network 
security assessment was warranted.  Following the five step methodology presented in 
Chapter 4, we uncovered and reported further security weaknesses within the network.  
Publically available information related to the network was gathered before DNS was 
used to source further information related to internal hosts.  Next the network was 
scanned for hosts and services within the associated IP address range.  Having located 
many services across the network, email and web technologies were given specific 
attention and automated network vulnerability scanning was carried out.  A number of 
security issues, some serious, were uncovered and presented. 
 105 
 
6. Conclusions and Further Work 
In this final chapter, we sum up this thesis‟s contribution, suggest future work and make 
recommendations for improving overall network security. 
6.1  IDS Contribution 
Below we sum up the work described in Chapter 3 on building a web enabled hybrid 
IDS and make some suggestions for how it might be improved. 
6.1.1  A Web-Enabled Hybrid IDS 
The research question we set out to answer in Chapter 1 was whether we could 
bring much-needed IDS technology to today's "security unconscious" Internet 
users. Motivations for and the design and implementation of a web-enabled, 
hybrid IDS aimed at meeting this need were described in Chapter 3. Our IDS 
has the following features: 
 Remotely administered and configured in order to relieve users of the technical 
complexity involved in typical IDS systems. 
 Intrusion analysis is offloaded to a server making it suitable for deployment on 
mobile devices of limited processing power. 
 Feedback is provided to users on the behaviour of their machine as seen by 
other machines on the network in order to detect malware infections unknown to 
the user.  All agents cooperate in monitoring each other. 
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 Associated network traffic is increased in volume only in the face of a possible 
attack through the use of a watchlist. 
 Web enabled functioning allows users to freely roam the Internet while 
receiving constant feedback on the threats they face. 
 Exports a web interface so users receive feedback through their web browser 
rather than having to learn a new application. 
 The system is simple to install compared with other IDS, particularly the client 
agent, which once installed, runs transparently. 
 Employs open source Snort for detailed intrusion analysis. 
 Demonstrates to users that they are targeted and in so doing, raises their security 
awareness. 
To test our IDS we deployed it on the DCU network where it revealed a number of 
issues, the most serious of which being attempted Slammer worm infections from 
foreign IP addresses. 
6.1.2  Further Work 
A number of possible enhancements not present in the current prototype due to time 
and/or resource constraints are presented below. 
Agent 
 Porting the agent to a number of other platforms is required since a number of 
operating systems will coexist on many networks.  For the prototype we 
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concentrated on the most common operating system, Microsoft Windows.  
Using a language which can be compiled for a large number of OSes, for 
example, Java, could be an answer to this issue.  A Java framework called Java 
Agent Development Framework (JADE) [132] is intended for development of 
peer-to-peer agent-based applications and could prove beneficial for future 
versions. 
 Addition of further processing at the client could be a possible extension.  In 
design and development the focus was on simplicity, speed and efficiency of the 
software to make it suitable for devices with limited processing capacity.  
However on clients with sufficient resources it may be possible to enable 
extensions such as packet inspection without negatively impacting user 
experience. 
 Spoofing is an issue which could potentially hinder the performance of this 
system.  For example, if machine „Attacker‟ on the network was to scan another 
machine „Scanned‟, but spoofs the sources of all packets to look as though 
coming from „Innocent‟, then „Scanned‟ will report suspicious activity as 
originating from „Innocent‟.  This issue was considered through development of 
our prototype and one possible solution is to record outgoing traffic at each 
client for a period of time in a first-in, first-out queue which would be checked 
when required.  Thus, the agent on „Innocent‟ would be queried by the server to 
ensure that the events attributed to it were actually sent from there.  This 
approach would require our agent to be running on all involved clients. 
 Addition of functions to block traffic would transform this IDS into an IPS.  
This functionality was considered as an enhancement and modules were 
developed to allow agents to interact with Windows Firewall on the client 
machine, blocking certain ports, source addresses etc.  The spoofing problem 
must be solved however before action can be taken against particular hosts. 
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 Ruleset profiles could allow the system to take a stricter approach to events 
while the user is located within an environment which is considered less secure.  
For example, Windows folder sharing might be enabled on a home network, but 
not on a public wireless network.  Using profiles, the ruleset could be configured 
automatically or manually based on current location.  Currently this can be 
implemented manually by having the server update the rules each time the client 
moves to another network, but this is ultimately impractical. 
Server 
 Although the server was not the area of focus for the author, its administration 
interface could benefit from more streamlined visuals, possibly including Web 
2.0 resources.  AJAX is already in use for automatic screen updates, but further 
enhancements could improve readability.  Visualisations including graphs could 
allow the administrator to quickly interrogate traffic patterns. 
 Aggregating similar data could reduce the amount of storage space required, 
but more importantly, aggregating similar data for presentation to the 
administrator would provide both a more useable interface and simpler data 
manageability.  Currently a scan of 1000 ports on one machine could cause up to 
1000 reports to delivered to the administrator and 1000 rows of data displayed 
on the interface.  Server functionality could be enhanced to analyse these events 
for similarities, displaying the group as one row.  The user could click for 
further details of each individual probe. 
Agent-Server Communication 
 Encryption of data in transit is a vital factor in this system along with 
authentication between client and server.  For deployment over the Internet, the 
current system would not be secure since an attacker could snoop and even 
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spoof alert or configuration packets to either client or server.  Since the XML 
based format used for configuration updates and alerts is straight forward, an 
attacker could capture a number of samples before generating valid XML to 
manipulate the client or server. 
 Testing for scalability would be useful in discovering how many agents can 
function together before the server becomes overwhelmed.  This will occur as 
the web server and Snort installation must handle an increasing number of report 
submissions as the number of agents grows.  Database and web servers could be 
separated across machines to alleviate the problem.  Rate-limiting agent 
submissions could also be implemented. 
 Aggregating similar events on the client would reduce bandwidth requirements.  
For example, currently a scan of 1000 ports may result in up to 1000 reports 
being sent to the server.  If the client could buffer data for a period and 
interrogate it before sending, similarities could be exploited in order to reduce 
network traffic. 
6.2  Network Security Recommendations 
In light of the issues uncovered in Chapters 3 and 5, we make the following 
recommendations for improving network security. 
1. Implement internal firewalling to prevent traffic reaching hosts from untrusted 
wireless networks. 
2. Implement internal firewalling to protect campus company hosts and subnets. 
3. Keep internal network information private by only making public that which 
must be shared with the public.  An internal intranet should be used for network 
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setup queries rather than having related newsgroup threads subsequently 
publically accessible. 
4. Remove zone transfer weaknesses from machines identified as being vulnerable. 
5. Separate DNS servers should be used for internal and external resolutions.  This 
will keep internal hostnames and network information private. 
6. There are 164 externally accessible web servers.  This number seems high.  
DCU policy should be to close externally accessible ports in the absence of a 
written e.g. annual request to have them kept open.  Implementing such a 
timeout would ensure that services no longer required are not left open 
indefinitely.  Hosting web sites centrally should be investigated as a means to 
provide those who need them with web servers.  Trusting secure administration 
to individual and unqualified users is not working. 
7. Insecure protocols should be disallowed, e.g. telnet and  FTP as there is simply 
no need for them given the existence of secure equivalents. 
8. Remove access to the Cisco switch identified in Chapter 5.  Password protect it 
and make it internally accessible only.  Also, remove external access to the 
printers also identified in Chapter 5. 
9. Disable „EXPN‟ and „VRFY‟ commands on all email servers that currently 
support them. 
10. Disable „TRACE‟, „PUT‟ and „DELETE‟ on all web servers that currently 
support them. 
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11. A general recommendation is to upgrade all internet facing services to their 
latest version.  There is a significant issue in the number of outdated software 
installations running on the Internet. 
12. The above recommendations are based solely on the results of external scans.  
Further assessment should be conducted from inside the DCU network. 
13. It should be easier to report security issues than is currently the case.  A 
dedicated email alias should be created to which users can submit queries and 
faults identified. 
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